Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht by Buiter, Willem H. et al.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
11-1-1992 
Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of 
Maastricht 
Willem H. Buiter 
Giancarlo Corsetti 
Nouriel Roubini 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Buiter, Willem H.; Corsetti, Giancarlo; and Roubini, Nouriel, "Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the 
Treaty of Maastricht" (1992). Discussion Papers. 682. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/682 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 
please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 1987, Yale Station
27 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, Connecticut 06520 
CENTER· DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 674 
EXCESSIVE DEFICITS:








Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate
discussions and critical comments. This is a revised version of the paper
originally written September 1992. 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present an evaluation of internationallyagreed limits on public sector debt and deficits such as thoseagreed by the EC countries in the Treaty of Maastricht aspreconditions for membership i~ a monetary union. These ·fiscalconvergence criteria require that general government budgetdeficits should not exceed 3% of GDP and that the gross debt of thegeneral government should not be above 60% of GDP. The Maastrichtrequirements, especially the debt criterion, are much morestringent than those required to ensure public sector solvency.Their implementation would require an excessive degree of fiscalretrenchment that would have negative consequences on the level ofeconomic activity. The deficit guideline does not appear to besensible, since . the numerical criterion refers to the nominalinterest payments-inclusive financial deficit, with no correctionsfor inflation and real output growth, no cyclical adjustment and noappropriate allowance for future revenue producing public sectorinvestment. The verbal qualifications are too vague to neutralizethe potential for serious
guidelines. 
damage attached to the numericalWe discuss the various "externality" arguments infavor of binding fiscal
theoretically and empirically.
rules and find them wanting both
An argument in favor of externalenforcement of binding fiscal rules might be made in the presenceof "excessive deficits" due to political distortions. We concludethat the fiscal convergence criteria should be disregardedapplied quite loosely in order to avoid the risk of serious fiscal
or 
overkill. 
JEL Classification: E62, E63, F33, H62, ttoJKeywords: European Monetary Union, Fiscal Policy, Fiscal Rules 
Willem H. Buiter Giancarlo CorsettiDepartment of Economics Universita' di Roma IIIYale University Roma, ItalyP.O. Box 1972 Yale Station (39 6) 49766356New Haven, CT 06520, U.S.A.




P.O. Box 1972 Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520, U.S.A.
Tel: (203) 432-3592 
1 
INTRODUCTION. 
The agreement reached by the governments of the twelve EC members at the 
Maastricht summit in December 1991, to move ahead towards full monetary union by 
the end of the decade at the latest, can with hindsight be seen as the crest of a wave 
of West-European integration that had begun to build in the mid-eighties. Since early 
1992, a sequence of adverse developments of increasing severity has undermined the 
progress towards European Monetary Union. The "no" vote in the Danish ratification 
referendum started the unraveling of Maastricht. The devaluation within the ERM of 
the Lira by 7 percent, agreed on Sunday September 13, 1992 came next. The token 
0.25% cut that same day in the German Lombard rate (and the 0.5% reduction in the 
German Discount Rate), reinforced by several Bundesbank official indiscretions, made it 
clear that the Bundesbank shared the opinion of a growing number of private financial 
market participants that further realignments were necessary. On September 17, the 
suspension of the ERM membership of the UK and Italy, followed by the floating of 
these two currencies, and a devaluation of the Peseta by 5% created a European 
financial panic. The convincing "yes" vote in the Irish ratification referendum and the 
the narrow "yes" vote in the French ratification referendum on Sunday September 20 
were not sufficient to ensure the ultimate survival of the Treaty. The decision by the 
British government to postpone a Parliamentary vote on the Treaty until after the 
second Danish referendum further lengthened the odds against the Treaty. 
It is therefore possible that the subject matter of our paper, the fiscal convergence 
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, may, like the whole of the Treaty, become moot 
from a short-term political point of view. Fortunately for us, the Maastricht 
convergence criteria raise issues that are important regardless of the success of the 
current attempt at achieving monetary union in Europe. The process of European 
economic integration will continue regardless of the fate of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Even if the Treaty does not survive the recent political challenges, attempts to revive 
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the EMS are still likely in the near future and renewed attempts at achieving monetary 
union can be expected. It is, however, likely (and in our view desirable), that 
monetary unification, if and when it happens, will follow rather than anticipate and 
precede greater political integration. The concerns with government debt and deficits 
expressed in the Treaty of Maastricht can thus be expected to resurface as monetary 
union comes back on the agenda. We therefore present our evaluation of 
internationally agreed limits on public sector debt and deficits as preconditions . for 
membership in a monetary union, without paying any further Danegeld to recent 
political developments. 
Fearing that a monetary union without sufficient economic convergence might be 
fragile and a source of ·economic and social tensions, the EC governments agreed that 
satisfying four economic convergence criteria would be a necessary condition for 
admission to the monetary union. Three of these conditions make some intuitive sense 
considering the goal of a stable monetary union. 
First, inflation rates among the member countries should converge to a level not 
too far above the inflation rates of the three members with the lowest inflation rates. 
A monetary union requires convergence to a common rate of inflation of tradable goods. 
While in principle this common inflation rate need not be a low or even a stable one, 
this concession to anti-inflationary rectitude is neither surprising nor necessarily 
harmful. Note, however, that it rules out the option of using the abandonment of the 
national currency as an anti-inflationary· device for a country that cannot deliver low 
inflation as long as it has any national monetary autonomy. 
Second, there should be stability of the nominal exchange rates for some time 
before monetary union and lack of persistent pressures for realignment. This too is not 
a logical prerequisite for a credible monetary union. One cannot dismiss the possibility 
(or even the desirability) of a final grand realignment the instant before exchange rates 
are irrevocably frozen and national currencies disappear, especially if the authorities 
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have managed to convince the public that such an end-game realignment would not 
occur. It may, however, not be optimal to start the new common currency era with a 
major act of fooling the people. 
Third, nominal interest rate should converge (to a level not more than two 
percentage points above that achieved by the three lowest inflation countries). With 
the very high degree of intra-EC :financial capital mobility achieved through the single 
market and given credibly fixed exchange rates (criterion two), the only source of 
interest differentials would be differential default risk. Convergence of inflation rates 
·(criterion 1) does not in and of itself eliminate sovereign default risk. Achieving the 
elimination of the sovereign risk premium. may be one motivation for the fourth and 
last convergence criterion. 
The fourth convergence criterion refers to fiscal policies: public deficits should be 
kept or reduced below 3% of GDP and public debt should be kept or lowered below 
60% of GDP. In the view of the backers and authors of the Treaty, lack of formal 
fiscal constraints would lead to "excessive deficits" and thus to monetary and financial 
instability. 
In this paper we assess the case for fiscal rules such as those agreed to at 
Maastricht. 1 Two sets of basic issues are raised. First, what is the logic behind the 
Treaty's concern with public debt and deficits ? Specifically, why should the 
Community worry about the consequences of "excessive" deficits, i.e.· what is the nature 
of the externalities that excessive deficits in one country might impose on other EC 
countries, and what is the evidence about their importance? Second, how are these 
theoretical criteria to be implemented in practice? 
The plan of the paper is the following. In Section I we present the fiscal criteria 
of Maastricht in greater detail and discuss their relation to the other convergence 
criteria. We will evaluate the official rationale behind the EC concern with deficits 
and debt and interpret the logic behind the particular numerical reference values chosen 
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at Maastricht. 
In Section II we analyze the present fiscal conditions in the EC countries as well 
as the historical trends in public sector deficits and debt, and compare them with the 
Maastricht targets. We will discuss whether the current path of fiscal policy in the
EC member states is sustainable and present simulations measuring the size of the 
adjustment effort required to satisfy the fiscal convergence criteria by the deadline for
monetary union. An important (and quite hotly contested) issue here concerns .the
consequences for the level of economic activity in Europe of a generalized fiscal
retrenchment by the EC aimed at reducing public sector deficits and debt towards the
Maastricht targets. Is there a risk of a deflationary and recessionart bias ? 
In Section III of the paper we consider in detail what appears the logic behind
the Treaty's concern with public debt and deficits. We evaluate the various arguments
for and against the fiscal rules. We also ask why any country would systematically
follow policies of "excessive" deficits; i.e. what are the economic or political distortions
that would lead to a persistent bias towards larger-than-optimal budget deficits, and
what is the empirical evidence about their prevalence? In the presence of political and
other distortions that lead to excessive deficits by member states, is there a role for an 
external agent (such as the EC) to impose rules for fiscal discipline, monitor their 
impiementation and credibly enforce them with a set of sanctions against deviant 
countries? Some concluding remarks are offered in Section IV. 
I. THE FISCAL CONVERGENCE CRITERIA OF MAASTRICHT. 
In 1989, the Delors Report argued that a European monetary union without fiscal
convergence might lead to monetary and economic instability in the Community2 and 
recommended the imposition of binding fiscal rules to limit policy makers' discretion in 
deciding the size and financing of fiscal deficits. Following the publication of the 
Delors Report the debate on "excessive" fiscal deficits, on the need for binding fiscal 
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rules in the EC and on the coordination of fiscal policies has been wide-ranging. 3 
The new Treaty approved at the Maastricht summit in December 1991 followed 
the spirit of the Delors recommendations by introducing a set of principles of fiscal 
discipline to be followed by member countries. The first principle is, in the words of 
Article 104c, that "Member States shall avoid excessive deficits". The definition of 
"excessive" deficits relies on two fiscal reference values for government deficits and debt 
that are spelled out in the Protocol on the excessive deficits procedure annexed to :the 
Treaty. The Treaty also establishes sanctions against countries found to be having 
excessive deficits. 
The second principle, expressed in Article 104b of the Treaty, is the "no-bail-out 
clause" according to which each member country (and only that member country) is 
responsible for servicing its public debt. This article implies that no Community 
member or agency will bail-out other member countries that experience a fiscal crisis. 
The third principle, expressed in Articles 104 and 104a, "bans direct central bank 
financing and access to favorable financing of public deficits, by prohibiting the granting 
of central bank credit to governments, the obligatory purchase by banks of public debt 
instruments and privileged access by governments to financial institutions" (Commission 
of the European Communities, Annual Report for 1991). 4 
The assessment of "excessive" deficits starts from two reference criteria for deficits 
and public debt. First, the general government deficit (net borrowing) should not 
exceed 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices; second, the general 
government gross debt should not exceed 60% of GDP at market prices. 
These reference values are important because a country formally found to have 
"excessive" deficits would fail one of the four criteria (the fiscal convergence criterion) 
for joining the monetary union and would therefore be excluded from it. 
Unlike the reference values for the inflation, interest rate and exchange rate 
convergence criteria, however, the fiscal reference values are not rigid and several 
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circumstances will be taken into account in deciding whether deficits are "excessive". 
First of all, a deficit in excess of 3% might be allowed if it "is only exceptional and 
temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value". 
Second, other factors specific to a country such as "whether the government 
deficit exceeds government investment expenditures" will be taken into consideration. 
This implies, for example, that a country with a high level of public investment (such 
as Spain or Portugal) might be allowed to run deficits in excess of 3% if it is deemed 
that such a high level of capital expenditures is appropriate. 
Third, a deficit might not be considered excessive if it "has. declined substantially 
and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value" (Article 
104c (a)). The significance· of this caveat is due to the possibility that, if the 3% 
criterion were applied rigidly as a convergence criterion for joining the monetary union, 
a number of countries (for example Italy) would be excluded from joining the monetary 
union even if they had significantly improved their fiscal performance. The caveat 
suggests that a country such as Italy might be allowed to join the monetary union at 
the end of 1996 or 1998 if its 1991 deficit of 10.2% of GDP had by then been 
significantly and continuously reduced to a value close to but still in excess of 3%. 
How close to 3% is, however, left vague in the Treaty. 
Fourth, a debt to GDP ratio in excess of 60% would not be deemed excessive if 
it is "sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory rate" 
(Article 104c (b)). The reason for this caveat is quite clear. A number of EC 
countries have debt to GDP ratios well above 60%, in the case of Belgium, Ireland and 
Italy above 100% of GDP with Greece just under 100% · of GDP. Economic wisdom 
(reinforced with simple numerical benchmark calculations reported in Section II of this 
paper and complete econometric model simulations reported in Section III), suggests 
that even with a major fiscal retrenchment in these countries it would be close to 
impossible to. achieve a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio to 60% of GDP in time for 
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the beginning of 1997 (or of 1999) deadline. 
One implication of these caveats is that the two reference values for deficits and 
debt will not be applied strictly and that countries whose deficits and/or debts exceed 
the reference values may not be found to have "excessive" deficits as long as they have 
made steady and substantial efforts towards achieving them. Another implication is 
that the wording of the Treaty is sufficiently vague that potentially irrelevant or even
'
harmful political considerations are likely to be used in the assessment of whether the 
fiscal convergence criteria have been met or not. 
The formal procedure that leads to a decision on whether a country has 
"excessive" deficits or not is complex and laid out in detail in Article 104c. First, the 
Commission writes a report on a country that does not satisfy the deficit or the debt 
reference values. The report (addressed to the Council) expresses the opinion of the 
Commission on whether an "excessive" deficit exists. Such an assessment will take into 
account all the factors and caveats discussed above. 
The Council, acting on a qualified majority, will decide whether the country has 
an excessive deficit. Before the currency union, a finding that the country has an 
"excessive" deficit would imply that the country has not fulfilled the fiscal criterion for 
convergence and would not be allowed to join the union. After the monetary union, a 
finding of uexcessive deficits" might lead to the imposition of a number of economic 
sanctions against the deviant country. 5 
It should also be observed that the fiscal convergence criteria for joining EMU are 
linked ( economically if not legally) to the other three convergence criteria, the inflation 
rate, the interest rate and the exchange rate convergence criteria. 6 The price stability 
criterion (together with the principle of no central bank financing of budget deficits at 
the discretion of the national governments) prevents the use of nationally differentiated 
seigniorage as a way of financing the fiscal deficit and reducing the debt ratios towards 
their target levels. The interest rate criterion is not redundant, even with the 
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increasing degree of international capital mobility among EMS members and in the 
presence of the inflation criterion. With efficient financial markets and ignoring 
differences due to taxation, international nominal interest rate differentials on public 
sector debt instruments are the sum of three components: the expected proportional 
rate of depreciation of the nominal spot exchange rate, the exchange rate risk premium 
(or currency risk premium) and a national default risk premium reflecting the 
possibility of debt repudiation due, for instance, to unsustainable fiscal positions. The 
criterion therefore implies that it is not enough, for a high debt and deficit country, to 
follow a strict anti-inflation policy that brings its current inflation rate down to the 
level of the best performing states. A serious fiscal adjustment is also required for a 
number of reasons. 
First, such an adjustment could reduce and eventually eliminate national default 
risk premia by insuring the feasibility of a binding commitment to meet the 
government solvency constraint. Second, the fiscal policy adjustment would also affect 
differentials in interest rates due to expected exchange rate depreciation and the 
currency risk premium; these two components of the international interest differential 
would disappear completely only if market participants were totally certain that the 
country would join the monetary union and stay with it irrevocably. Since what 
represents sufficient fiscal adjustment is left vague in the Treaty, markets will attach 
positive probability to the prospect that a country will be excluded on the basis of 
fiscal criteria; and this probability will be higher for countries with worse fiscal 
conditions. This, in turn, will tend to keep nominal interest rates higher than they 
would be otherwise, since being unable to join EMU might undermine the fiscal and 
inflation credibility of the country and thus create a future exchange rate depreciation 
risk. 
What can be inferred about the underlying motivation for Maastricht's concern 
about "excessive deficits"? One interpretation is that "excessive deficits" is really a 
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code word for "excessive government size" or "excessive public spending". In this view, 
the protagonists of binding commitments to reduce excessive deficits hope and/or expect 
(like the intellectual fathers of Reagonomics) that spending cuts rather than tax 
increases will be used to achieve such reductions. However, if we take the Treaty and 
its intellectual antecedents at face value, it appears that behind its rules against 
"excessive" deficits lies the concern that, in the absence of such binding fiscal rules, at 
least some EC governments might be subject to a systematic bias towards excessive 
budget deficits and that this bias might have serious negative external effects on other 
EC countries. The key externalities that have been stressed by proponents of EMU are 
the following 7: 
1. Excessive deficits by a member country might eventually lead to an 
unsustainable public debt position and to a fiscal solvency crisis including debt default 
that will force the other member countries into a fiscal "bail-out" of the insolvent 
government. 
2. A fiscal and financial crisis in one EC country could, through fundamental 
financial interdependence or through contagion effects, spread to other countries and 
force the future European Central Bank (ECB) to inject excessive liquidity into the EC 
financial system, thus creating additional inflationary pressure throughout the EMU 
area. 
3. Even when government solvency is not an issue, there are international interest 
rate and exchange rate spill overs from national deficit financing policies. Such 
external effects must be internalized by cooperative action. In the budgetary field, 
centrally imposed and enforced rules are the best way of achieving cooperative behavior. 
Another issue raised by the Maastricht Treaty concerns the logic behind the 
particular numerical reference values of 3% of GDP for the deficit and 60% of GDP for 
the public debt. At first glance, the particular levels that were chosen appear 
arbitrary; the debt reference value is very close to the average value of this indicator 
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for the EC in 1991 (61.7%) while the actual average deficit-GDP ratio in 1991 (4.3%) 
was above the reference value. There is of course no reason to believe the current 
average values to be optimal for the EC as a whole (on average), let alone for each of 
the 12 individual member states, which differ greatly in economic structure (levels and 
real growth rates of per capita GDP, inflation rates, degree of financial development, 
tax structure and tax administration capacity, size of the state enterprise sector etc.) 
and as regards initial conditions. 
Simple debt dynamics accounting shows that the debt to GDP ratio evolves 
according to the following formula: 
7Pt(I.1) dt - dt-1 = - [1 + 'I/Jt]dt + deft 
where deft is the· deficit to GDP ratio, dt is the debt to GDP ratio, and ¢t is the rate 
of growth of nominal GDP, the sum of the growth rate of real GDP and the rate of 
(GDP) inflation. When the debt to GDP ratio is constant we get: 
(I.2) dt = [(1+¢t)f¢t] deft 
Equation (I.2) suggests that in the long run the deficit and debt guideline can 
only be consistent with each other given particular assumptions about the long run 
growth rate of nominal GDP. EC documents forecast an average long run growth rate 
of re~l GDP of 3% per year for the EC countries. 8 One of the main objectives of the 
monetary union is price stability. In the particular European context, this probably 
translates into a target inflation rate for the GDP deflator around 2% per year. 
Complete price stability for internationally traded goods is likely to imply a positive 
( around 1 or 2 percent per annum) rate of inflation for broad price indices like the 
GDP deflator and the CPI, which include non-traded goods whose prices tend to rise 
faster than those of traded goods. Note that not even Germany in its prime achieved 
a sustained zero inflation rate. 9 A real growth target of 3% and an inflation target of 
2% then sum to a long term growth rate of nominal GDP of 5% per year. Thus, 
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equation (I.2) shows that for the EC as a whole, a steady state deficit of 3% of GDP 
per year and a 5% growth rate of nominal GDP require a stable long run debt to 
GDP ratio of approximately 60% (with continuous compounding it would be exactly 
60%). 
There may appear to be some deeper economic logic behind the choice of the 3% 
numerical reference value for the deficit-GDP ratio. A number of EC documents refer 
to the "golden rule of public finance" 10 according to which only capital expenditures 
can be financed with borrowing while current expenditures should be covered with 
current revenues. This principle requires that the gross savings of the government 
should always be larger than or equal to zero (with perhaps an exception for cyclical 
fluctuations). As it happens, capital expenditures in the EC have averaged 3% of GDP 
for a long period of time.11 In this sense the 3% net borrowing guideline could be. 
interpreted as implementing the idea that borrowing should be used only for investment 
purposes (under the maintained assumption that public investment will remain at 3% of 
GDP). 
On reflection, however, the derivation of the reference value for the deficit from 
the "golden rule of public finance" appears to be false, except in a world with a zero 
rate of inflation. That "golden rule of public finance" does not state that the 
i
I
"nominal" net lending of the government should not exceed its capital spending; it says 
instead that the real "gross savings" of the government must be non-negative where 
the gross savings are equal to the inflation-adjusted net lending of the government 
minus gross government capital spending. With a 3% deficit to GDP ratio and public 
investment to GDP ratio, if the target inflation rate is 2% per year and the steady 
state debt to GDP ratio is equal to 60%, real government savings would actually be 
positive and approximately equal to 1.2% of GDP, the reduction in the real value of a 
60% debt ratio induced by 2% inflation. Thus, in the steady state implied by the 
Maastricht rules only part of public investment (up to 1.8% of GDP) would be 
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financed by borrowing.12 13 It follows that, other things being equal, the "golden rule" 
would still be satisfied if we considered steady states characterized by higher ratios of 
debt and deficit relative to GDP. 
II. FISCAL CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS OF THE EC COUNTRIES. 
Il.l THE CONDITIONS IN 1992. 
How do the Maastricht fiscal guidelines stack up against the current general 
government debt- and deficit ratios of the Community members? If we compare the 
fiscal guidelines chosen at Maastricht with the fiscal conditions of the EC in 1991/92, 
we observe that very few countries satisfied these guidelines in 1991 and even fewer are 
expected to satisfy them in 1992. As shown in Table II.1, only Germany, France, the 
UK, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg kept their general government net borrowing 
below 3% of GDP in 1991 and only France, Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg are 
expected to do so in 1992. Regarding the debt ratio requirement, Table II.2 shows 
that the only EC countries with a gross general government debt to GDP ratio below 
60% in 1991 were Germany, France, the UK, Spain and Luxembourg (Portugal, at 
64. 7% and Denmark at 66. 7% just fail to qualify). In 1992 the same five countries are 
again the only ones expected (according to the EC's generally somewhat optimistic 
forecasts) to meet the debt ratio criterion. 
While only Germany, France, the UK and Luxembourg satisfy both criteria in 
1991 and only France and Luxembourg are expected to satisfy both criteria in 1992, 
there is a wide divergence in the fundamental fiscal conditions of the other countries. 
At one extreme, the worst fiscal problems are faced by Italy and Greece. These two 
countries are characterized by very large budget deficits (10.2% of GDP in Italy and 
16.5% of GDP in Greece during 1991). Table II.3 shows primary balances that are 
either barely in surplus (a virtual primary balance in 1991 for Italy, with a 0.7% of 
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GDP primary surplus expected, very optimistically, for 1992) or still in deficit (3.3% in 
1991 and, very optimistically, an expected 0.5% in 1992 for Greece). Debt to GDP 
ratios remain very high (101.2% for Italy and and 96.4% for Greece in 1991). 
The underlying conditions of the other two high government debt countries, 
Belgium and Ireland are quite different. While these two countries are characterized 
by very high debt to GDP ratios (129.4% for Belgium and and 102.8% for Ireland in 
1991) that are the consequence of huge deficits in the 1970s and early 1980s, they now 
show substantial primary surpluses (4. 7% for Belgium and 6% for Ireland in 1991) and 
overall deficits that are reasonably low. In Ireland, the debt to GDP ratio has been 
steadily falling since 1987. In Belgium, the debt to GDP ratio has been approximately 
stable at its 1987 level. 
An intermediate country is the Netherlands where the debt ratio, although quite 
high (78.4% of GDP in 1991), has stabilized since 1990 thanks to growing primary 
surpluses (equal to 2.0% of GDP in 1991). Moreover, the overall deficit in 1991 
(3.9% of GDP) is quite close to the Maastricht guideline. Spain and Portugal differ 
from each other in a number of ways. The overall fiscal deficit is quite small for 
Spain (at 4.4% of GDP) and moderate in the case of Portugal (at 6.4% of GDP). In 
the case of Spain the debt ratio is below 60% ( 45.6% in 1991) while Portugal is above 
the guideline (64.7% in 1991). Spain, however, still has a small primary deficit (0.2% 
of GDP in 1991) while Portugal has a 2.1% of GDP primary surplus in 1991. 
Germany and the United Kingdom both have comparable debt ratios well below 
60%. The West-German overall deficit was 3.1% of GDP in 1991 while Britain scored 
2% that year. Both countries are, however, expected to violate the deficit ratio 
criterion in 1992. In spite of the fact that the U.K. deficit is expected to be well 
above the German one in 1992 (4.9% as opposed to 3.4%), the structural fiscal 
conditions of the U.K. may be more robust than the German ones. In fact, the U.K. 
deficits in the 1991-1992 period appear to have a major cyclical component, reflecting 
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the recession that resulted when Britain joined the exchange rate arrangements of the 
EMS at a greatly overvalued parity. This transitory cyclical component of the deficit 
should disappear ( except for the interest on the additional debt accumulated during the 
recession) as and when the UK gets out of the present recession. The recent British 
suspension of its ERM membership and the associated depreciation of Sterling and cuts 
in interest rates make a recovery more likely. The component of the German deficit 
that reflects the unification process, while not cyclical, should nevertheless not expected 
to be permanent. There is, however, considerable uncertainty and disagreement about 
the magnitude and degree of persistence of future the net budgetary transfers to 
households, firms and other agencies in the former DDR. Their likely duration surely 
exceeds that of the typical business cycle. 
Denmark is borderline on the debt criterion (66.7% of GDP in 1992), but solid 
primary surpluses and low overall deficits (2% of GDP in 1991) put her among the 
more fiscally sound economies. Finally, France and Luxembourg are the only two 
countries to satisfy both fiscal criteria, with fiscal deficits equal to 1.7% of GDP in 
France and -2.5% of GDP in Luxembourg and debt ratios equal in 1991 to 47.2% and 
6.9% respectively. 
II.2 THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH DEFICITS AND DEBT. 
While very few countries will fulfill the fiscal guidelines in 1992, the historical 
experience of the past few decades, shown in Tables II.l, Il.2 and Il.3, also suggests 
that fiscal deficits and debt ratios above the Maastricht reference values have occurred 
regularly in the past. Even disregarding the high deficits and debt to GDP ratios of 
many European countries in the period right after World War II, debt ratios above 
60% and deficits above 3% have been quite common in the last 30 years. 
In the 1960s, the gross debt to GDP ratio was above 60% in the United 
Kingdom and Belgium. The rate for the U.K. had been close to 130% in 1960 ( a 
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leftover from the WWII debt build-up) and by 1970 was still equal to 80%. The 
Belgian ratio was over 80% in 1960 and had fallen to 68% by 1970. In all the other 
EC countries (but Italy) the debt to GDP ratio was falling in the 1960-1973 period 
while the average overall deficit to GDP ratio was on average below 3% per year in all 
countries but Ireland (see Tables II.l and II.2). 
The post-1973 stagflationary period was characterized by the rapid rise in the 
ratio of general government expenditures in GDP and the emergence of very large and 
persistent budget deficits and rising debt to GDP ratios in most European countries. 
In particular, the debt to GDP ratio was above 60% some time during the decade in 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the U.K. Moreover, during the 1971-1980 decade, the 
general government budget deficit was on average at or above 3% of GDP in Belgium 
(5.1%), Ireland (8.4%), Italy (7.6) and the United Kingdom (3.0%). Also, deficits in 
excess of 3% of GDP were observed in West-Germany (in 1975-76), Denmark (in 
1980), the Netherlands (in 1979-80).14 
While some fiscal retrenchment occurred in the 1976-1979 period after the deficits 
and the debt build-up following the first oil shock, large and persistent fiscal deficits 
were experienced again in the 1979-1983 period following the second oil shock which, in 
the cases of Italy, Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands, led to a 
significant increase in the debt to GDP ratio. Overall, during the 1980s, deficit to 
GDP ratios averaged above 3% of GDP in Belgium (8.8%), Greece (12.9%), Spain 
(4.6%), Ireland (9.3%), Italy (11.2%), the Netherlands (5.8%), Portugal (7.9%). 
Moreover, all the remaining EC countries but Luxembourg (that is, Denmark, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom) experienced deficits in excess of 3% of GDP at some 
point during the 1980s. As a consequence of these fiscal imbalances, the debt to GDP 
ratio peaked at 122% in Ireland in 1987, at 132% in Belgium in 1988, at 80% in 
Denmark in 1984 and at 75% in Portugal in 1988, while it had not yet stabilized in 
1991 in Italy and Greece. The debt-GDP ratio in the Netherlands may just have 
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peaked in 1991/92. 
Since the mid 1980s, the fiscal balances of a number of these countries have 
improved; dramatic fiscal retrenchment and large primary surpluses in Denmark, 
Belgium and Ireland have led to a reduction in the debt to GDP ratio in these 
countries; since 1988 a significant fiscal adjustment has occurred in Portugal as well, 
and a smaller adjustment has taken place since 1991 in the Netherlands. In Italy and 
Greece, however, the fiscal adjustment in the last few years has not been sufficient to 
prevent further increases of the debt-GDP ratio. 
Il.3 SOLVENCY, SUSTAINABILITY AND PRIMARY GAPS. 
The Treaty clause about the need to avoid "excessive" deficits stems in part from 
a concern that a number of member countries are following fiscal policies that are not 
sustainable in the long run. An important policy question is therefore whether the 
empirical evidence tndicates that the government's intertemporal budget constraint or 
solvency constraint is actually likely to be met in each EC country if past and current 
patterns of behavior persist. 
Empirically, the answer to this question is difficult because the solvency constraint 
per se generally imposes only mild restrictions on the behavior of the public sector. 
In principle, almost any finite duration path of revenue and expenditure can satisfy it: 
large and persistent deficits today can always be offset with large surpluses at some 
time in the future. However, while the solvency constraint does not rule out policies 
generating large primary general government deficits for prolonged periods of time, it 
does rule out the possibility that these policies be maintained forever when the initial 
stock of debt is positive. 
A first approach to the empirical testing of the solvency condition is the one 
followed by Hamilton and Flavin [1986) and Wilcox [1989) (see also Trehan and Walsh 
(1989), Buiter and Patel [1990), Corsetti (1991), Corsetti and Roubini [1991, 1992a) and 
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Wickens [1992]). This class of tests stems from the following idea. The intertemporal 
budget constraint of the public sector is satisfied if, in the limit, the value of future 
government debt discounted to some fixed initial date goes to zero. The validity of 
the present-value budget constraint can therefore be verified by estimating the data 
generating process for the discounted debt and checking whether the long run value of 
the discounted debt vanishes in expectation. 
Using such solvency tests for a large set of OECD countries over the sample 
1971-1989, Corsetti and Roubini [1991, 1992a] find that problems of sustainability of 
the present paths of fiscal policy appear to exist in Italy, Belgium, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Greece. Note that these countries have in common a large current 
debt to GDP ratio (close to or above 100% in Italy, Belgium and Ireland). 
This class of solvency tests is carried out under the maintained hypothesis that 
the data generating process describing the evolution of discounted debt and/or deficit is 
stable (in the sense of parameter constancy) over time. The weakness of this approach, 
therefore, is that it may fail to capture structural breaks in these processes deriving, 
for example, from the structural changes in fiscal policy that have occurred in countries 
such as Ireland or Belgium in the mid 1980s and in the Netherlands since the 
beginning of the nineties. 
The solvency conditions for the government are (extremely) forward-looking. Any 
assessment of solvency therefore depends on assumptions about the evolution of future 
primary balances into the indefinite future. Apart from the solvency tests described 
above, there are several alternative approaches in the literature to deal with this 
problem, all of which can be encompassed in a simple framework that looks at the 
"primary gaps" of the fiscal authorities. The idea of the "primary gaps" (see 
Blanchard [1990] and Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor [1990]) is to consider 
the difference between the constant primary balance (as a share of GDP) that would 
stabilize the debt to GDP ratio over some time horizon and the actual primary 
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balance. This concept is interesting in the Maastricht context because it suggest the 
minimum necessary amount of fiscal adjustment required to stabilize and start reducing 
the debt to GDP ratio. One can define alternative measures of the primary gap.
*First, define sN as the N-period required primary surplus, i.e. the constant 
primary surplus-GDP ratio that has to be maintained to keep the debt-GDP ratio 
constant between periods t and t+N. *Note that, to calculate sN one needs projections 
of the future real interest rates and growth rates of real GDP during the next N 
periods. Then, define the N-period actual primary surplus-GDP ratio, s~, as that 
constant primary surplus-GDP ratio whose present discounted value is equal to the 
present discounted value of the primary surplus-GDP ratios that are actually planned 
or expected to prevail between periods t and t+N. Then, the N-period primary gap, 
GAPNt , is defined as the excess of sN* over sN.
a 
Note that when N ~ 1, the 
construction of the N-period primary gap requires forecasts not only of future interest 
rates and growth rates, but also of future primary surpluses. The lazy person's or 
myopic N-period primary gap, MGAPf , shortcuts this · need for predicting future 
primary surpluses by considering the excess of the N-period required primary
*surplus-GDP ratio, sN, over the current primary surplus-GDP ratio, st, instead of over 
the N-period actual primary surplus-GDP ratio, s~. Obviously, when N = 1, the 
one-period required primary gap GAP} and the myopic one-period primary gap 
MGAPi coincide and that the calculation of MGAP} does not require any forecasts 
other than those going into the calculation of the current real interest rate and current 
growth rate of real GDP. 
Next, we can define the constant primary surplus-GDP ratio that ensures 
long-run solvency which we shall call the permanent required primary surplus-GDP 
ratio1 s
*. The calculation of s* requires estimates of the long-run real interest rateCD CD 
(the internal rate of return on a real consol or index-linked perpetuity) and the 
long-run growth rate of real GDP. Note that if the long-run interest rate exceeds the 
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long-run growth rate, the required permanent surplus-GDP ratio is not only the 
constant primary surplus-GDP ratio that, if maintained indefinitely, would ensure 
government solvency. It is also the constant primary surplus-GDP ratio that will 
ensure that, ultimately, the debt-GDP ratio does not exceed any finite upper limit 
(including its current value). 
The permanent primary gap, GAJ>% ,is the excess of the permanent required 
* primary surplus-GDP ratio sCD over the permanent actual primary surplus-GDP ratio 
sa. The permanent primary gap was proposed in Buiter [1983, 1985 and 1990) as aCD 
measure of the the magnitude of the permanent correction required to the annuitized 
present discounted value of current and expected future primary surplus-GDP ratios in 
order to ensure government solvency. The measure is silent on whether the correction 
should involve tax increases (including increases in seigniorage revenue) or spending 
cuts. Finally, the myopic permanent primary gap, MGAP~ , is the excess of the 
* permanent required primary surplus-GDP ratio, sCD , over the current primary 
surplus-GDP ratio, st, instead of over s!. 1s 
One feasible empirical approach is the one followed in Blanchard, Chouraqui, 
Hagemann and Sartor [1990) which implements empirically the myopic N-period 
primary gap measure for N = 1 and 5 years and attempts a preliminary N-period 
primary gap calculation for N = 40 years. Other measures of the primary gaps for the 
European countries have been computed by Wickens [1992). 
Our own calculations of the one-period primary gap GAP1 and the myopic 
permanent primary gap MGAPCD are given in Tables II.4 .and II.5. 
Table II.4 first gives the EC forecasts for real GDP growth, the implicit real 
interest rate the for as as 1991and primary surplus 1992, well the debt-GDP ratio. 
*The last two columns provide the required one period primary surplus s and the1 
!-period primary gap, GAP 1 for 1992. 
Table II.5 assumes a 3 % long run growth rate of real GDP and a 5 % per 
20 
annum long-run real interest rate for all EC countries. Column 3 has the same 1991 
debt-GDP ratios as Table II.4, and the last two columns give, respectively, the 
required permanent primary surplus-GDP ratio and the excess of the required 
permanent primary surplus-GDP ratio over the primary surplus-GDP ratio forecast for 
1992 by the EC. Note that higher real interest rates or a lower real growth rate 
would imply larger primary gaps (increasing, for each 1% increase in the real interest 
rate or reduction in the real growth rate, by a percentage of GDP equal to the debt to 
GDP ratio). 
There is reason to believe that the EC forecasts of the primary surplus-GDP 
ratios for 1992 are rather optimistic. Table II.6 gives the excess of the 1992 primary 
surplus-GDP ratios forecast by the EC over those forecast (six months later) by the 
OECD. 
Table 11.5 shows that the required permanent primary surplus-GDP ratio is quite 
large for countries with a high debt to GDP ratio (2.5% of GDP for Belgium, 2.0% for 
Ireland, 1.9% for Italy and 1.9% for Greece). However, while Belgium and Ireland 
have large primary surpluses in excess of the required permanent balance, so that their 
debt to GDP ratio will be falling over time, Greece and Italy show actual primary 
deficits and large required permanent surpluses so that the myopic permanent primary 
gaps are large. In the case of Italy the EC has an optimistic forecast for the 1992 
primary balance of 0.7% (of GDP) surplus; given a required permanent surplus of 1.9%, 
a (permanently sustained) improvement in the primary balance of 1.2% of GDP would 
be needed to ensure solvency of the Italian Treasury.16 Similarly, in Greece the 
respective figures are a -0.5% actual primary deficit, a 1.9% required permanent surplus 
and a 2.4% myopic permanent primary gap. 
Table 11.5 also shows significant myopic permanent primary gaps for the United 
Kingdom (2.4% of GDP), Germany (1.5%) and Spain (1.4%). As was pointed out 
already, however, the U.K. situation is biased by a large cyclical primary deficit; the 
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cyclically adjusted or structural primary gap would be much smaller for this country. 
Germany, instead, is still expected to exhibit healthy growth in the EC forecasts for 
1992, so that its actual primary deficit represents a structural deficit associated with 
the unification costs. Finally, France, Denmark, Portugal and Luxembourg show 
negative myopic permanent primary gaps that imply "supersolvency" and indeed a 
long-run falling debt to GDP ratio (assuming unchanged primary surpluses and 
economic conditions). 
The single period primary gaps reported in Table II.4 are different (and usually 
smaller) for a number of countries, relative to those computed in Table II.5 using 
(assumed) long term values for interest rates, growth rates and inflation rates. The 
reasons for these differences are quite important and worth discussing given their policy 
implications. Estimates of the long-run real rate of interest tend to be obtained from 
two sources: for the UK from the index-linked government bonds issued since the early 
years of the Thatcher era and for the rest of the universe by looking at long-term 
fixed rate nominal government debt and guessing a long-run rate of inflation. 
There are three reasons why in 1991 the excess of the one-period interest rate 
over the one-period growth rate differs· from its longer-run counterpart. 
First, unlike our long interest rate, which in principle is calculated using the 
current long market rate, our one-period "effective" rate is calculated by dividing the 
actual interest payments by the face value of the debt. The effective interest rate on 
the existing stock of debt will tend to be lower than actual current market rate for 
new debt, when interest rates are at historically high levels (as they are today), with 
the magnitude of the difference depending on the maturity structure of the debt. 
Second, the use of privileged forms of financing (such as low interest postal 
deposits) permanently lowers the (average) implicit interest rate below the long-term 
Treasury bond yields that lie behind the myopic permanent primary gap calculations. 
Third, unusually high current real growth rates and unusually low current real interest 
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rates bias the single-period required primary surplus-GDP ratio downwards relative to 
any multi-period required primary surplus-GDP ratio.17 
The empirical weight of these factors is quite important. For example, the 
one-period primary gaps for Germany, the U.K., Spain and Greece lower (at 0.5%,are 
2.1%, 0.5% and 0.8 of GDP respectively) than the myopic permanent primary gap with 
r=5% and g=3% (at 1.5%, 2.4%, 1.4% and 2.4 of GDP respectively). Conversely, 
one-period primary gaps are larger in Italy than in the long run exercise (as the one 
year real interest rate vs. growth differential was actually close to 3% rather than the 
2% assumed in the myopic permanent gap calculations.). 
In summary, while primary gaps (except for the non-myopic permanent primary 
gap which we do not try to calculate) are not by themselves measures of debt 
sustainability, they are useful complements to other measures of solvency; inferences 
about sustainability derived from primary gaps also tend to be consistent with those 
derived from other tests. In particular, Italy and Greece need major primary fiscal 
corrections in order to avoid insolvency; Germany will at some point have to deal with 
its structural deficit, while the UK primary gap is mostly driven by cyclical factors. 
Belgium and Ireland will have to continue their recent policies of large primary 
surpluses if they wish to achieve further reductions in their debt to GDP ratio. In 
France, Denmark, Portugal and Luxembourg, present policies are consistent with long 
term solvency. 
II.4 WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO MEET THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA? 
While the primary gap calculations suggest the minimum amount of fiscal 
adjustment required to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio, the actual Maastricht objectives 
are much more restrictive since they require a reduction in the debt-GDP ratio towards 
the 60% target. The goal of this subsection is therefore that of exploring two related 
issues. First, what would be the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio if the deficit 
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reference value and the inflation target are reached by end-1996 (or end-1998) ? 
Second, how large a primary and overall fiscal adjustment would be required to satisfy 
the debt ratio criterion by end-1996 ( or end-1998) ? 
Consider first the "What happens to the debt?" question. Starting from the 
debt-GDP ratio inherited at the end of 1991, debt91 and assuming that the deficit 
target of 3% of GDP is reached on time (by the target date of December 31 1996 or 
December 31 1998), what will the debt-GDP ratio be on the target date (debt96 or 
debt98) ? From equation (I.1) we see that to answer this question we need the 
growth rate of nominal GDP 7Pt and the deficit-GDP ratio deft for each period from 
1992 to the end of 1996 or 1998. In Table II. 7 we consider two pairs of scenarios. 
The first pair, scenarios (a) and (b) outline an extremely disciplined fiscal adjustment 
where each EC country that is now above the 3% deficit and the 5% nominal GDP 
growth will reach these levels (through gradual adjustments) by end-1996 (in scenario 
(a)) or by end-1998 (in scenario (b)).18 The second pair, scenarios (c) and (d) present 
hypothetical cases where these deficit and nominal GDP growth targets are achieved 
immediately in 1992. They show the debt to GDP ratio obtained by end-1996 
(scenario (c)) or end-1998 (scenario (d)). This second pair of scenarios is presented to 
show that, relative to scenarios (a) and (b), an immediate convergence of inflation rates 
can partially undo the effects of a substantial fiscal retrenchment on the debt-GDP 
ratio. 
Table II. 7 makes it abundantly clear that satisfying the deficit criterion and 
meeting the inflation target together would not do much to reduce the debt-GDP ratio 
even in the hypothetical case in which these targets were reached right away in 1992 
(scenarios (c) and ( d)). For example, in the most favorable scenario, Italy only lowers 
its debt-GDP ratio from 101.2 in 1991 to 90.2. The same point holds for high 
inflation countries such as Greece (high debt) and Portugal (low debt), where, however, 
the debt to GDP ratio decreases relatively more in scenarios characterized by a 
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combination of slow inflation and deficit adjustment. 19 The high debt and low inflation 
countries (Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium) do effectively nothing to their 
debt-GDP ratios when they meet the deficit targets. 
The next question we address is "Starting from the 1991 inherited debt-GDP 
ratio, what constant deficit-GDP ratio will cause the debt-GDP target to be reached 
on time?". We again consider two pairs of scenarios (for the excess debtors in 1991 
only). In Table II.8, scenarios (a) and (b) have nominal GDP growth declining 
gradually to 5%. The target date for the debt ratio is end-1996 for scenario (a) and 
end-1998 for scenario (b). Scenarios (c) and (d) consider the case in which the 
nominal GDP growth target is reached immediately in 1992 and maintained thereafter. 
The target date for the debt ratio remains end-1996 (scenario (c)) or end-1998 
(scenario (d)). 
Clearly, for countries like Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Greece, Table II.8 describes 
the economics of the lunatic asylum. For the Netherlands and Portugal there would be 
considerable pain. Only Denmark would have an easy ride. To try and achieve the 
debt target even by the end of 1998 would require hefty to very hefty overall budget 
surpluses. For Belgium the turnaround relative to 1991 would be about 11.5 % of 
GDP. 
Table II.9 shows the 1991 primary deficit-GDP ratio, and the constant primary 
deficit-GDP ratio that achieves the debt target by end-1996 or end-1998, on the 
assumption of a 5 percent real interest rate and a 3 percent growth rate of real GDP. 
Table II.9 confirms the story of Table II.8: out of the seven countries~ that do not 
satisfy the debt criterion in 1991, only Denmark can relax, reduce its primary surplus 
and still meet the debt target by the end of 1996 or 1998. Belgium and Italy would 
have to experience Mexican-style increases in primary surpluses in order to meet the 
debt target by the end of 1996 or 1998. 
Would the required adjustment be more realistic if the seven countries m Table 
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II.8 and II.9 were only required to move halfway to the debt target of 60% of GDP by 
1996 or 1998? Tables II.10 and II.11 provide the answer. The average of the 1991 
*debt-GDP ratio and 60% is denoted d . 
While the figures in Tables II.10 and II.11 are clearly less extravagant than their 
counterparts in Tables II.8 and II.9, the required primary adjustment ( comparing the 
figures in the column below -s91 in Table II.11 with those in the columns to its right) 
is still massive for Italy, Belgium and Greece. Comparing Table II.11 with Table II.5, 
we also note that the primary surpluses required to get even only halfway to the 
Maastricht debt target by 1998 is significantly higher than the primary surpluses 
required to ensure solvency for all seven countries currently exceeding the Maastricht 
debt norm (Italy (6.1% vs 1.9%), Belgium (8.2% vs 2.5%), Greece (6.9% vs 1.9%), 
Ireland (5.3% vs 2.0%), the Netherlands (3.2% vs 1.5%), Portugal (2.4% vs 1.2%) and 
even Denmark (2.4% vs 1.3%)). 
We conclude that while especially Greece, Italy, Belgium and Ireland require 
serious fiscal retrenchment, any attempt to get even halfway to the Maastricht debt 
targets (and at the latest day) is likely to involve serious fiscal overkill. The blatantly 
unrealistic debt target clearly is not helpful for these countries in designing effective 
fiscal programs. 
Ill. THE MAASTRICHT BUDGETARY GUIDELINES: A CRITIQUE. 
In this section we use economic theory and econometric empirical evidence to 
evaluate the pros and cons of the Maastricht budgetary fiscal ..· guidelines in greater 
detail. 20 
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ID.LON APPROPRIATE INDICATORS OF GOVERNMENT DEBT AND DEFICIT. 
ID.LL Gross versus net debt.' . 
The debt criterion is defined in terms of the nominal or face value of the gross 
financial debt of the general government 21 rather than the economically more relevant 
net non-monetary liabilities of the consolidated general government and central bank 
sector22. The two concepts differ in four respects. 
First, since to a close approximation the gross financial debt of the general 
government differs from the gross non-monetary liabilities of the consolidated general 
government and central bank sector by the amount of the monetary base, in practice 
the criterion used at Maastricht penalizes the countries that because of historical 
accident or past policies have a high ratio of monetary base to GDP. 23 
Second, general government gross financial assets (even quite readily marketable, 
liquid financial assets) are not netted out against gross financial liabilities. To consider 
the importance of this point, we can compare the value of the net debt of the general 
government (computed by the OECD), which differs from the gross debt by the value 
of the financial assets (but not the value of the public enterprises and other "real" 
assets) of the general government. As Table III.1 shows, the differences between net 
and gross debt can be sizable in several countries. For example, in the Netherlands 
the gap between the gross and the net debt is equal to 20% of GDP (78% for the 
gross debt as opposed to 59% for the net debt). 
A country could achieve a reduction in its gross debt just by liquidating its 
financial assets and using the proceeds to redeem part of the gross debt; such a 
financial operation would leave the net debt unaffected but could significantly reduce 
the gross debt. 
Third, in all European countries the general government owns public enterprises 
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whose value should be counted in order to get a meaningful measure of the net 
liabilities of the public sector. Privatization receipts, which should be counted as 
financing (that is, as equivalent, to a first approximation, to government borrowing), 
can be used to reduce conventional government debt issues, thus relaxing, under the 
Maastricht rules, the financial constraints on the government. In the convenient 
benchmark case where the government sells a state enterprise for its post-privatization 
market value and where this private market value is equal to its continuation value in 
the public sector (the present discounted value of its cash flow in the public sector), 
the correctly measured net worth of the government sector is not altered by the 
privatization. 24 
This discussion makes clear that financial engineering through the liquidation of 
general government financial assets and the privatization of public enterprises can be 
used to reach the Maastricht debt and deficit targets without there being any real 
fiscal adjustment. Note that this lowers the effective cost to the government of using 
privatization to finance public spending, thus creating a bias towards reducing the size 
of the public sector, inclusive of state enterprises. Even where privatization is desirable 
for efficiency reasons, it is bad economic policy to do the right (structural) thing for 
the wrong (financing) reasons, especially when the financial sleight of hand involved can 
come back to haunt one in the future. 
Fourth, Bovenberg [1991] and Bovenberg and Petersen [1991] have pointed out 
that differences in the way the government finances its pension obligations to its 
employees can have important implications for its longer-run financial position. The 
two extremes are on the one hand the Netherlands, whose supplementary civil service 
pensions are fully funded, and on the other hand Germany and France, where there is 
no funding of public sector pensions of any magnitude. Social security pensions tend to 
be fully unfunded throughout the EC. 
Most countries make pension scheme premiums tax deductible while benefits are 
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taxable. A few, however, have non-deductible premiums and non-taxable benefits. 
Other things being equal, the postponement of taxes under the first scheme relative to 
the second scheme, amounts to a loan by the government to the pension funds and its 
contributors. To make the financial position of two countries operating under the two 
different tax systems comparable, the value of the implicit loan could be subtracted 
from the conventionally measured public debt. 
After correcting for differences in funding practice of public sector pensions and 
social security pensions and in the tax treatment of pension fund premiums and 
benefits, the corrected general government debt of the Netherlands amounts to 33 
percent of GDP in 1989 (against an uncorrected figure of 80 percent of GDP). 
Germany moves from an uncorrected figure of 43 percent of GDP to a corrected figure 
of 38 percent, France from 47 percent to 45 percent and the UK from 39 percent to 3 
percent! 
ID.1.2. The nominal deficit guideline. 
The Maastricht deficit guideline refers to the nominal, cum interest, overall 
( current and capital) fiscal balance of the general government. This does not appear to 
be a desirable fiscal target or constraint. 
III.1.2a Inflation differentials. 
The authors of the Maastricht Treaty seem unconcerned about and/or unaware of 
the distinction between nominal and real interest rates. A large component of interest 
payments in several EC countries represents a purely nominal rather than a real 
interest burden. Therefore, a fiscal guideline based on nominal cum interest deficits is 
not very appealing as long as inflation rates among the EC countries are not equalized. 
Note that the inflation convergence criterion permits a country to exceed the average 
inflation rate of the lowest three inflation countries by 1.5 percent per annum and still 
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to qualify for participation in EMU. We can expect that, if and when the member 
states of the EG have a common currency, there will be no sizable permanent national 
or regional differences in inflation rates.2 6 Until we get to that point, however, there 
are likely to be differences that should be allowed for in the any deficit criterion. 
Ill.1.2b Real growth differentials. 
Historically, growth rates of real GDP have differed significantly among EC 
members. Convergence in growth rates of real GDP is also not one of the Maastricht 
criteria. Quite the opposite in fact applies: economic and social solidarity will require 
the real growth rates of the poorer members of the Community to exceed those of the 
richer ones for decades to come. The debt to GDP ratio stabilizing budget deficit is of 
course different for countries with different growth rates of real output. Countries with 
a higher growth rate of real GDP can ceteris paribus safely support a higher 
deficit-GDP ratio. 
ID.1.3. Tax-smoothing and Keynesian arguments in favor of countercyclical budget 
deficits. 
A correct interpretation of the deficit guideline is crucial in assessing how rigidly 
the deficit ceiling will be applied. There are many positive and normative reasons why 
fiscal deficits would emerge during recessions. First, automatic stabilizers are at work. 
Many major areas of public spending ( e.g. unemployment compensation, social welfare 
expenditure, early retirement benefits, job retraining and subsidies for ailing firms) are 
inherently counter-cyclical, so that portions of government spending tend to rise 
automatically during recessions, while tax revenues linked to the level of economic 
activity fall. 
Moreover, both Keynesian and neoclassical (tax-smoothing) models of fiscal deficits 
suggests the optimality of deficit spending during recessions. The neoclassical theory of 
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the optimal use of distortionary taxes suggests that temporary (exogenous) increases in 
expenditures and temporary (exogenous) reductions in the tax base should be reflected 
in temporary government deficits and permanently higher tax rates. In a Keynesian 
framework, the operation of automatic stabilizers is often reinforced by discretionary 
demand management intervention. 
Does Maastricht allow for counter-eyclical deficit spending ? At best, the 
wording of the Treaty is ambiguous on whether recurrent fiscal deficits due to cyclical 
downturns in excess of the reference value would be allowed. The Protocol states that 
a deficit in excess of 3% might be allowed if it "is only exceptional and temporary and 
the ratio remains close to the reference value". While the concepts of temporary and 
exceptional are are vague, one interpretation of this wording is that deficits in excess of 
3% due to cyclical factors such a recession might not be deemed excessive. This 
interpretation is supported by the Article reference to the104c "medium 
term... budgetary position of the Member State" as being relevant to the assessment of 
the existence of excessive deficits. On the other hand, Article 104c specifies that the 
deficit excess should be "exceptional" as well as "temporary"; the stress on the 
"exceptional" suggests an interpretation where regular deficits in excess of 3 percent of 
GDP due to cyclical factors might not be considered acceptable.26 
ID.1.4. The Golden Rule of public sector investment. 
The Treaty refers, without mentioning it by name, to the "golden rule" of 
government financing: balance the current budget and borrow no more than the amount 
of gross public sector capital formation. The German negotiators were (for domestic 
constitutional reasons) especially keen on this rule for virtuous borrowing. 
The practical problems associated with any attempt to distinguish consumption 
spending from investment are well known. "Current" expenditures on education, such 
as teachers' salaries are an obvious example. Even if that problem is solved, the 
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"golden rule" for financing government expenditure makes no economic sense and can 
lead to bad policy choices. 
First, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with borrowing to finance public 
consumption expenditures, even if we ignore tax-smoothing arguments and possible 
Keynesian benefits from government borrowing in economies with widespread capacity 
underutilization. The permanent income and life cycle hypotheses have formalized the 
insight that it is desirable to smooth consumption over time and across states of nature 
when current income streams are variable and/or uncertain. While consumption 
smoothing in the face of a temporary decline in income can of course be achieved 
without borrowing (by running down a positive stock of (financial) wealth that has 
been accumulated for that purpose), it may, at certain times and for some economic 
agents, be better to smooth consumption by varying one's financial liabilities. As long 
as the borrower realizes that, ceteris paribus, future consumption will have to decline in 
present value by as much as current consumption increases, there is no prima fade 
reason to second guess his intertemporal choices and forbid consumption loans. An 
obvious exception to this laisser faire attitude would have to be made if there is 
convincing evidence that market failure has resulted in saving rates lower than· the 
social optimum. 
Second, many socially useful and desirable government investment projects do not, 
either directly (say, through user fees) or indirectly (say, by boosting the productivity 
of the private economy and thus the tax base) increase the future balance of 
government receipts over non-interest expenditures by an amount at least equal in 
present discounted value to the cost of these projects. In that case financing by 
borrowing must sooner or later be supplemented by policies to raise revenues or cut 
other non-interest expenditures to make up the shortfall. Unlike a private firm, a 
government will often knowingly engage in investment projects whose returns need not 
(exclusively) take the form of enhanced future cash flow for the government. The 
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social rate of return on a government investment project need bear no relation to its 
total (direct and indirect) effect on the government's future cash flow 27 • To the extent 
that the government does not appropriate the social returns to public sector investment, 
naive application of the "golden rule" of public sector financing may be a recipe for 
weakening the public sector balance sheet that can ultimately lead to insolvency, even 
if the social rate of return is at least equal to the government's cost of borrowing. 
ID.2. SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF A FISCAL CONTRACTION IN 
THE EC. 
Maastricht elevates a number slightly below the current EC average debt-GDP 
ratio to one-sided or asymmetric debt norm (values above the norm are frowned upon, 
values below the norm are not). A number significantly below the current EC average 
deficit-GDP ratio is likewise made into a one-sided or asymmetric deficit norm. If 
pursuit of these norms is taken seriously over the next few years, fiscal policy in the 
EC will be subject to a contractionary bias. There is no mention in the Treaty of the 
need for a less restrictive average stance of monetary policy to compensate for this 
contractionary fiscal bias. 
Rather little is known· empirically about the long-run effects on the level and 
growth rate of real output of a fiscal contraction. If the fiscal contraction takes the 
form of a cut in productive public expenditure (such as public sector investment that is 
not a close substitute for private capital formation) the effects on the long-run output 
level and (in endogenous growth models) output growth rates may well be negative. 
The Maastricht Treaty tries to guard against this by being more lenient about 
borrowing to finance public sector investment. 
A permanent cut in public sector consumption would, in the simple representative 
agent model, simply boost private consumption one-for-one, with no effect on private 
capital formation. In most other standard models, (such as OLG models) there are 
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positive effects on private investment (and thus on the long-run level and perhaps 
growth rate of real GDP) from cuts in public consumption spending. 
Fiscal contraction through tax increases or through cuts in transfer payments and 
subsidies will have long-run effects on the level and growth rate of output that are 
very specific to the precise instrument chosen (think of an increase in the corporate 
profits tax versus a cut in unemployment benefits). 
The short-run effect on economic activity of public spending cuts or tax increases 
works mainly through aggregate demand acting on output and employment because of 
short-run rigidities in money prices and wages and the presence of liquidity constrained 
economic agents. A standard model (the Dornbusch version of the Mundell-Fleming 
model) has a negative effect on aggregate demand of an unexpected, immediately 
implemented fiscal contraction. The depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate 
and, in a large economy, the decline in interest rates caused by the fiscal contraction 
mitigate but do not negate completely the negative effect on output and employment. 
In other words, government borrowing crowds out private borrowing, but less than 
one-for-one. 
Taking Maastricht seriously would in all likelihood lead to a multi-year sequence 
of tax increases and spending cuts for the EC as a whole. The standard model also 
has the property that the current effect of anticipated future fiscal tightening is 
expansionary. Today's long interest rate falls and todays exchange rate depreciates, in 
response to the anticipated decline in future short interest rates associated with the 
future fiscal contraction. As the future materializes, of course, the expansionary 
announcement effects wear off and the contractionary effects of concurrent fiscal 
retrenchment dominate. 
The announcement of a sequence of fiscal tightening, beginning immediately, 
would be expansionary only if the scale of the spending cuts and tax increases were to 
increase over time. It therefore seems likely that the impact effect on the level of 
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economic activity of attempts to satisfy the Maastricht criteria will be negative. Three 
independent model simulations by the OECD (Englander and Egebo [1992]) using 
INTERLINK, by Giovannini and McKibbin [1992] using the MSG model and by the 
IMF (in a confidential study), support this conclusion, although the quantitative 
magnitudes involved differ considerably. 
A key problem in evaluating the consequences of attempts to satisfy the 
Maastricht criteria is the specification of the base-line or reference scenario, that is, the 
counterfactual to the pursuit of the fiscal norms of EMU. It clearly would make no 
sense to assume that, absent Maastricht, the 12 EC members ( or the 11 pre September 
1992 ERM members) would, until end-1996 or end-1998, simply maintain their current 
deficit-GDP ratios (or even their cyclically adjusted or structural deficit-GDP ratios). 
With or without EMU, Italy should (and in all probability would) take steps to reduce 
its fiscal imbalance. The same is true for Greece and to a lesser extent, also for 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.28 
Recent press reports have referred to a confidential IMF study on the economic 
effects of Maastricht. On the basis of such press reports and a press release by the 
French government 29 the following results can be inferred. The medium-term 
(1992-1996) IMF simulations assume for the reference scenario that primary budget 
deficit-GDP ratios are held constant from 1992 on. 30 Two alternative "Maastricht 
scenarios" are considered. Both scenarios show the consequences of the gradual 
implementation of policy measures to achieve, by 1996, the required degree of 
convergence of budget deficits and inflation rates, but not necessarily of the debt-GDP 
ratios. Scenario I (Convergence with Risk Premium Adjustment) assumes that the 
process of convergence gradually eliminates the risks of nonparticipation in stage 3 of 
EMU and thus removes the interest differential between Germany and the other EMU 
members. Scenario II (Convergence without Risk Premium Adjustment) assumes that 
despite the fiscal and inflation convergence, the interest differential between Germany 
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and the rest persists at its 1992 level.31 
Not surprisingly, the result is a deeper contraction in Scenario II (sans credibility) 
than in Scenario I (mit credibility). For the EC as a whole, the cumulative output 
loss relative to the reference scenario over the period 1992-96 is 0.4 percent ( of the 
1992 level) in Scenario I and 0.8 percent in Scenario II. 32 Output growth rates are 
above their reference levels before the end of the period in Scenario I. The negative 
output effects are concentrated overwhelmingly in Italy, especially in Scenario 2 where a 
cumulative output loss of over 2% is incurred.33 34 
Englander and Egebo [1992] take as their base-line or reference path the OECD 
secretariat 1993 projections, which already contain short-term tightening of budgetary 
policies and disinflationary monetary policies in line with the stated medium-term 
objectives of national policy makers. 35 While Englander and Egebo report preciously 
little quantitative information about their simulation (no information at all is given 
about real GDP and only graphical information is provided about unemployment) their 
findings appear consistent with the IMF simulations. 
First, the extent to which the fiscal cut backs are contractionary depends to a 
large extent on the fiscal- monetary policy mix adopted by Germany. Tighter fiscal 
policy and looser monetary policy in Germany minimize the output and unemployment 
cost of achieving the Maastricht deficit and inflation criteria. 36 
Second, for countries requiring major deficit reductions, the effect on economic 
activity is negative, despite the interest rate reductions. The unemployment rate in 
Italy rises to almost 12 percent by the end of 1996 (more than 2 percentage points 
above base line), while the Spanish unemployment rate reaches 16 percent in 1996, 
about 1.5 percentage points above base line. The impact on Denmark, Ireland, France 
and the UK, countries whose required adjustments are minor, are small. Belgium goes 
through a large transitional increase in unemployment. The simulated impacts on 
debt-GDP ratios are rather small, despite the sometimes large reductions in 
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deficit-GDP ratios. 37 Finally, external spillovers beyond the EC are very modest. 38 
Giovannini and McKibbin [1992] report qualitatively similar findings for the EC 
countries, although the magnitudes involved are rather more dramatic. 39 The base line 
has fiscal deficit-GDP ratios in Europe at their 1991 levels "for the foreseeable future". 
Inflation converges to the German rate by 1996 due to the constraints imposed by the 
EMS. The Maastricht scenario has each country with a fiscal deficit above 3% of 
GDP target at 3% of GDP by 1996. 4o 
In the Maastricht scenario, Italy gets slaughtered. On impact output falls by 
about 11 percent relative to base line. While the recovery is rather swift, even by 
1996 output is still almost 1 percent below base line. The proximate cause of this 
recession is a very large increase in real interest rates. The culprit is the large 
reduction in inflation (by more than 7 percent in 1992), the counterpart of the very 
deep recession. 41. Outside Italy, relative little happens, although Germany, with 
contractionary monetary and fiscal policy, experiences a mild recession. 
Our own view is that the output and unemployment costs of Maastricht are likely 
to be somewhere between the excessively low estimates of the IMF (and the OECD) 
and the implausibly high numbers of Giovannini and McKibbin. 
It is worth noting that, while the three simulation studies did place the 
Maastricht policy experiment in a global context, the average monetary-fiscal policy 
mix for the Community as a whole in relation to the monetary-fiscal policy mixes in 
North America and Japan appears not to have been a concern to the authors of the 
Treaty, which maintains an inward-looking silence on this issue. 
ID.3. PROS AND CONS OF VAGUENESS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE 
MAASTRICHT FISCAL CRITERIA. 
In defense of the Maastricht guidelines, it is often argued that the two reference 
values for deficits and debt will not be applied strictly, that all sorts of caveats 
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(discussed above) would be taken into consideration and that a country whose deficit 
and/or debt exceed the reference values may not be found to have "excessive" deficits 
as long as it has made steady and substantial efforts in getting close(r) to them. It 
should also be noted, however, that another implication of the vagueness in the wording 
of the Treaty is that irrelevant or inappropriate political considerations are likely to 
play a role in the assessment of whether the fiscal convergence criteria have been met. 
A number of strategic issues come to mind. Suppose, for instance,, that a country 
like Italy would be allowed to join EMU, having reduced its deficit from 11% to a 
level somewhat above the 3% reference value (4% of GDP for example) and having 
reduced its debt to GDP ratio slowly but continuously by late 1996 or 1998. 
Permission to join might be considered a reasonable and likely reward for such a 
continuous and significant adjustment of the deficit and debt ratios. 
Suppose, moreover, that a different country, for example Denmark, with a deficit 
in 1992 close to 6.0% of GDP, were to make a much smaller fiscal adjustment and also 
reduced its deficit to 4% of GDP by the EMU deadline. Should Denmark then be 
excluded from EMU in spite of having a deficit equal to the Italian one and a debt to 
GDP ratio much smaller than the Italian one (61% of GDP against the Italian 107% 
in 1992), simply because of its lack of significant and continuous fiscal adjustment ? 
Or should it be allowed to join because of its better overall fiscal and debt position, 
reflecting Denmark's earlier fiscal retrenchment in the 1980s? 
More generally, should countries like Denmark, Belgium and Ireland, that did 
much of their "continuous and significant" fiscal adjustment during the 1980s be treated 
more or less leniently than countries (like Italy and Greece) that will make most of 
their adjustment in the 1990s at the earliest? And how would the incentives for fiscal 
retrenchment by countries such as Denmark be affected by the knowledge that they 
might satisfy the fiscal criteria as long as their deficit and debt ratio values are no 
higher than those of a country like Italy ? Finally, how would the incentives of 
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countries like Italy be affected by the knowledge that the reference values are not strict 
and that other countries might also decide their adjustment effort on the basis of the 
effort undertaken by a country like Italy ? 
ID.4. THE RELATION OF THE FISCAL CRITERIA TO THE OTHER 
CONVERGENCE CRITERIA. 
The budgetary norms are neither necessary, nor sufficient, nor necessarily useful 
for satisfying the other convergence criteria in the Treaty of Maastricht. We have 
already discussed how the fiscal convergence criteria for joining EMU are linked to the 
other convergence criteria, concerning the inflation rate, the interest rate and the 
exchange rate. 
Since the interest rate criterion is worded with reference to the interest rates of 
the three member states that have the lowest inflation rates (rather than with reference 
to the interest rates of the three member states with the lowest interest thererates), 
could, in principle, be room for strategic behavior by member states. For example, the 
public debt of a country with falling but still high debt and deficit ratios might carry 
a large international interest differential, reflecting both expectations of exchange rate 
depreciation and sovereign default risk. In that case, the country would have a strong 
incentive to be a very low inflation country because its low inflation would then be 
used to define the interest rate criterion. 
The interest rate criterion may well be hard to satisfy, even for a low inflation 
country. Interest rate differentials might persist because of risk premia reflecting the 
market's perception of the odds that a country will not be allowed to join EMU (and 
will therefore remain subject to devaluation risk) because of insufficient (albeit steady) 
fiscal adjustment. One could envisage self-fulfilling equilibria with a country being 
excluded from EMU on the basis of the fiscal and interest rate criteria, despite a 
significant reduction in its primary deficit, because nominal interest rates have remained 
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high (reflecting currency realignment risk)" and have caused larger interest-inclusive 
financial deficits. While the 2% spread in rates allowed by the interest rate criterion 
leaves some flexibility and implicitly recognizes the possibility of still wide interest 
differentials, such scenarios cannot be dismissed. 
ill.5. WHAT ARE THE EXTERNALITIES OF "EXCESSIVE DEFICITS"'! 
Assuming that a bias towards "excessive" deficits exists, what is the nature of the 
negative externalities that an excessive deficit in one country imposes on the other EC 
countries ? As mentioned in Section I, three kinds of externalities have been appealed 
to as justifications for the fiscal rules: (a) fiscal bail-out externalities; (b) monetary 
bail-out externalities and (c) interest rate, exchange rate or effective demand 
externalities, that is, international spillovers through market prices and the level of 
economic activity. 
ill.5.1. The fiscal bail-out argument. 
This argument suggests that excessive deficits by a the government of a member 
country might eventually lead to an unsustainable debt position and to a solvency crisis 
that will force the member countries into a fiscal "bail-out" of the deviant country, 
that is a net transfer from solvent to insolvent governments. 
Germany has been especially concerned about this bail-out risk and has insisted 
on the introduction of language in the Treaty stressing that neither the Community 
agencies nor the member states are under any obligation to bail out insolvent member 
states. The "no bail-out principle" is stated clearly in Article 104b of the Treaty: if a 
member country fails to service its debt, there will be no bail-out by the Community 
or by other member states; the defaulting member country and its creditors will bear 
the consequences of such a fiscal crisis. 
Underlying the fiscal bail-out argument are two assumptions. The first is that 
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private markets are not going to offer effective discipline against deviant fiscal behavior. 
The second is that the no bail-out clause of the Treaty ( Article 104b) is likely to be 
ineffective and needs backing up with a rule that, if enforced, will make the no 
bail-out clause moot, because no default will ever occur. 
As regards the first of these propositions, it is frequently argued that with a fixed 
exchange rate (and a fortiori with a common currency), national governments that issue 
debt denominated in the common currency will not be subject to effective discipline 
and restraint by the financial markets. This argument has rather little going for it. 
Assume that EMU is a fact and that a common currency ( the ECU) has been 
adopted. If, for instance, the German government, unwilling to face paying the fiscal 
price of German unification, were to continue issuing large amounts of debt (now 
denominated in ECUs), it would in due course have to pay a growing sovereign risk 
premium in its ECU interest rate. In addition, and more important in practice, it 
would sooner or later encounter credit rationing. It would be unable to sell debt in 
any currency and at any rate of interest. 
The disappearance of the national currency implies that exchange rate risk or 
currency risk disappears as a source of national interest differentials. Other forms of 
risk ( especially sovereign default risk) will continue to be priced in the market and to 
be reflected in quantitative constraints on borrowing. These sovereign risk premia 
should be incurred only by the deviant countries through an increase in their country 
risk premium, but should not affect the interest rates of other Community borrowers. 
It has been argued that market discipline through higher interest rates for 
countries following undisciplined fiscal policies might not work if financial markets are 
not very good in assessing the default risk of a deviant country (see Goldstein and 
Woglom [1992) for evidence on risk premia in the US municipal bond market). 
However, if the probability of a fiscal bail-out is close to zero and if the European 
central bank is credibly committed to price stability, imperfections in the capital 
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market that lead to weak market discipline should be of no concern to the Community 
since there is no reason why these imperfections will affect Community-wide interest 
rates. Specifically, if a fiscal crisis and default does not lead to external effects the 
costs of these market imperfections will be borne only by the defaulting country and its 
creditors. 
For the proper functioning of the national and international credit markets it is 
necessary that the member states of the EMU (and the supranational organs of the 
Community) make it absolutely clear and credible, that national debt is and remains 
the exclusive obligation and responsibility of the national government in question and of 
those who, now or in the future, pay taxes to this government. This is exactly the 
purpose of the "no bail-out clause" 42. The same is of course true without EMU and 
without a common currency. Whether or not such a formal commitment against debt 
bail outs can be made credible is a practical political issue. Experience shows that this 
is not difficult in practice. For instance, in the US this has long been the case for the 
debt of individual states and of local government units. 43 
Some observers have argued that, regardless of formal or informal statements 
about a "no bail-out" rule, the Community would be hard-pressed not to intervene and 
support a member country whose excessive deficits had brought it to a financial crisis 
with serious risk of default. The very idea of an economic, monetary and political 
union, so the argument goes, implies a degree of 'solidarity' or 'cohesion' that would 
imply some form of support in case of a fiscal crisis. The presence of an explicit no 
bail-out clause in the Treaty, however, suggests that this extension of the concept of 
solidarity was not what the authors of the Treaty had in mind. In any case, solidarity 
or cohesion considerations suggest aid from the rich to the poor, not from the fiscally 
sound to the fiscally unsound. 
We also see little reason to believe that intra-Community international solidarity 
will be strengthened by EMU, or that EMU will strengthen the bargaining power of 
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debtor governments vis-a-vis creditor governments. What, after all, can post-EMU 
debtor governments threaten creditor governments with that they cannot already 
threaten them with today? That they would abandon EMU and restore their national 
currencies? How does this threaten creditor governments? That they would default or 
some or all of their internally or externally held debt? That option is equally available 
with or without a common currency, and the costs to the defaulter are well-known. 44 
The hub of the fiscal externality argument is that a national government debt 
default may have adverse systemic effects, say for the functioning of the 
community-wide financial system ( or for a key part of it like the banking system or 
the payments system). If the scale of the default is large and if a significant share of 
the defaulting government's debt is held by private institutions (such as commercial 
banks and other deposit-taking institutions) that are vulnerable to sudden "runs", that 
is, to demands for immediate conversion of their liabilities into cash, a financial panic 
and liquidity crisis could result. While the contagion and bandwagon effects that 
propagate such confidence crises are not very well understood (but see Diamond and 
Dybvig [1983] and Eaton [1987] for informative analytical approaches to the issue), 
experience teaches us that they can cause serious damage. Note, however, that the 
damage can be limited through cooperative action by the national governments of the 
other Community members and the supranational bodies. Such concerted support need 
not imply, de jure or de facto, that the defaulting government is relieved of its debt 
burden. Consider, for instance, the case where a large chunk of the defaulting national 
government's debt is held by that nation's banking system (or indeed by another 
member country's banking system)45. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
and the European Central Bank (ECB) can play the "lender of last resort II function 
without "taking over" the debt of the defaulting government and without raising the 
trend rate of growth of the nominal money stock in the EC as a whole. Moral hazard 
problems can be avoided by making sure that policy of safeguarding the payments 
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system ('saving the banks') goes hand-in -hand with the realization of appropriate 
losses by those owning equity in the banks and with the dismissal of the banks' 
managers. 
ID.5.2. The monetary bail-out argument. 
The second half of the bail-out argument is that the fiscal norms are necessary to 
render it impossible (or at any rate unlikely) that the new ESCB will effectively be 
forced to monetize the budget deficits of countries without fiscal discipline. This can 
be viewed as a special case of the general fiscal bail-out argument, with the ECSB 
acting as the fiscal agent in the transfer to the defaulting debtor government. Fear 
that a fiscal and financial crisis in one EC country could spread to other countries 
(whether through psychological bandwagon and contagion effects or through portfolio 
exposure) might force the future European Central Bank to inject excessive liquidity in 
the EC area and thus to create monetary and price instability. 
The possibility that a fiscal crisis in a member country might lead to an indirect 
bail-out through a debt monetization on the part of the European central bank is 
unlikely. The Maastricht Treaty is very clear about the principle of the 
"independence" of the European central bank, the primacy of the objective of "price 
stability" and the elimination of any privileged financing of the deficits by the 
country's central bank. 
The formal independence of the proposed ESCB and ECB vis a vis the 
governments of the member states and the supranational authorities of the European 
Communities is greater even than the formal independence of the Bundesbank today. 
This holds for the appointment procedures for members of the Executive Board and 
Governing Council and for the absolute ban on overdrafts and other credit facilities 
with the ESCB and ECB for all EC, national, regional, local and other public 
authorities. The ban on direct purchases of government debt instruments by the ESCB 
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is of course only cosmetic, since "indirect" purchases (that is all purchases of debt 
instruments in the secondary markets) are permitted. 
The one major formal blot on the ESCB independence banner is the vague and 
confusing verbiage in the Treaty concerning the powers of the Council of Ministers over 
the common external exchange rate (Article 109). Substantive central bank 
independence requires that the central bank be in charge of exchange rate policy. If 
the Council of Ministers were to have power over exchange rate determination, or even 
just power to choose the broad outline of the exchange rate regime ( fixed versus 
managed floating etc.), then the independence of the ESCB would be seriously 
undermined. Would the Council of Ministers, for instance, have the authority to decide 
that the value of the ECU should be fixed in terms of some basket of non-ECU 
currencies? If the answer is "yes", the independence of the ESCB would be vacuous, 
as it would no longer be able to pursue price stability as it saw fit, except to the 
extent that the ESCB could assume a leadership role vis-a-vis the central banks of the 
rest of the world, just like the Bundesbank has today within the EMS. 46 
Even if a central bank is formally completely independent of the executive and 
legislative powers, it remains possible that its effective or substantive independence is 
severely restricted by other agents (such as the ministry of finance) who can maneuver 
it into a position where its domain of choice is very limited. While this is in principle 
a possibility with the ESCB, it will not -be relevant in practice because after EMU any 
national fiscal authority will be in a considerably weaker position vis a vis the new 
ESCB, than it is today vis a vis its own national central bank. The ESCB will be (to 
an even greater degree than the Bundesbank is today) the "leader" in the 
monetary-fiscal game of chicken (see Sargent [1986, pp. 19-39]) at least until the 
supranational executive and legislative institutions of the EC are as strong relative to 
the ESCB as today's national Treasuries and Legislatures are in relation to their 
national central banks. 
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ID.5.3. International spillovers with solvent governments. 
Another class of arguments suggesting the need for internationally agreed rules for 
fiscal discipline is based on international spillovers of economic policy, and specifically 
on interest rate, exchange rate and activity externalities, that are present even when 
there is no risk of government default. Since the spending and financing decisions of 
even fully solvent governments spill over into other countries ( through integrated credit 
markets, goods markets and factor markets) in ways that are not fully taken into 
account and valued by national governments, uncoordinated national fiscal policies 
might lead to spending levels and/or fiscal deficits that are suboptimal and 
beggar-thy"-neighbor. 
One often hears references to the "external effects" of government budget deficits 
(see e.g. Bovenberg et. al. [1991] and Commission of the European Communities [1991]). 
If, for instance, the German government finances its deficit in the capital markets, this 
will ceteris paribus raise real interest rates in Germany and in all countries tied to 
Germany through efficient capital markets 47• From this premise, which is 
non-controversial ( unless one is a believer in Ricardian equivalence) it is then inferred 
that such negative external effects must be opposed and, if possible, avoided altogether. 
Both the designation "external effects" and the characterization "negative" require 
further scrutiny. 
When Bonzo increases his purchases of bananas in a competitive market with an 
upward-sloping banana supply schedule, the price of bananas will rise. This is good 
news for all those who are long in bananas (net banana exporters) and bad news for all 
those who are short in bananas (net banana importers). The increase in the price of 
bananas is exactly what ought to happen if the market system is to do its job of 
allocating resources efficiently. The price· increase inflicted by Bonzo on other banana 
buyers and sellers is what economists call a pecuniary externality. It is to be 
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distinguished sharply from technological externalities, effects of one agent's actions on 
the consumptions sets, utility functions or production functions of other agents for 
which no appropriate price is charged. In complete competitive markets, no adverse 
efficiency consequences are associated with pecuniary externalities. They are merely 
another word for general market interdependence. As is clear from the banana 
example, the price changes will have distributional consequences. If these are 
undesirable, policy makers are free to do something about that with the most effective 
redistribution instruments at their disposal4B. 
Deficit financing has two important distributional consequences. First, by 
borrowing instead of covering its expenditures with current taxes, the government 
engages, holding all else constant, in intergenerational redistribution. 49 Second, the 
reduction in total (private plus public) saving that results from the substitution of 
borrowing for tax financing at given real interest rates, will put upward pressure on 
real interest rates and also, in all likelihood, cause an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate and an increase in the external terms of trade. Thus, when a government finances 
a deficit in the capital markets and interest rates rise, this is good news for creditors 
everywhere and bad news for debtors everywhere50 • It is also good news for net 
exporters and bad news for net importers. If this form of redistribution is undesirable, 
governments are free to respond appropriately. It is extremely unlikely that the best 
way to achieve the desired redistribution is by forbidding budget deficits or debts above 
a certain level. Note that it is also quite irrelevant whether the deficits under 
consideration finance public consumption or productive public investment. 
There are theoretical arguments, for the international coordination, on efficiency 
grounds, of virtually every aspect of budgetary policy. With very limited exceptions, 
however, the need for coordination does not arise with respect to government deficit 
and government debt. When the economy has "pre-existing" distortions, or when the 
instruments the government manipulates in the pursue of national advantage create 
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inefficiencies or distortions, an efficiency-based case for fiscal coordination may exist. 
Among the pre-existing distortions that may make policy transmission through market 
prices inefficient are: distortionary taxes and transfers51; technological consumption or 
production externalities; non-competitive behavior; incomplete markets; and Keynesian 
market failure reflecting insufficient or excessive effective demand (the practical 
problems of productive international coordination are an important subject in their own 
right, which cannot be addressed here). However, even in these cases, the need for 
fiscal policy coordination almost never requires limits to government deficits and debt. 
For example, non-cooperative equilibria of a multi-country fiscal game in a Keynesian 
model, which are Pareto-inefficient, might be characterized by either excessive or 
insufficient government contributions to aggregate demand, depending on the nature of 
the international spillovers and the relative weights put by the policy makers on 
different objectives. 
An argument can in principle be made for internationally agreed limits on public 
borrowing when taxes are distortionary. In this case, the increase in a nation's public 
sector deficit has real external effects on other countries if their governments have 
positive stocks of debt outstanding. Higher world interest rates increase the foreign 
governments' real interest bills, which have to be serviced by distortionary taxation 
(Canzoneri and Diba [1991]). 
International effective demand spillovers from government deficit financing when 
labor and product markets are in non-Walrasian equilibrium and credit market 
imperfections generate multiplier effects also blur the distinction between pecuniary and 
technological externalities, but there is no general presumption that such spillovers 
imply that deficits are excessive rather than insufficient. The effective demand spillover 
argument is of course not restricted to the case of deficit financing and would apply 
equally to balanced-budget variations in public spending. 
On balance, it seems fair to say that no convincing efficiency-based theoretical 
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case has been made for a supranational coordination mechanism such as the Maastricht 
fiscal norms. There already is an international coordination mechanism, the 
international financial markets. It is ironic that Brussels insists on encumbering with 
international quantitative norms the one corner of budgetary policy where there exists 
virtually no efficiency case for international coordination. Conversely, the Treaty says 
nothing about fiscal issues that do require international coordination or supranational 
regulation such as the provision of local, regional, national and EC-wide public goods, 
tax competition and fiscal federalism. 
Is it perhaps appropriate to set norms cooperatively in Europe for reasons of 
intergenerational redistribution or for redistribution between creditors and debtors ( or 
between exporters and importers), when deficit financing changes intertemporal relative 
prices (or static international relative prices)? We are not aware that this has been 
the subject of intergovernmental discussion at the EC level. Indeed, there is little or 
no consensus on these issues within national economies. These distributional questions 
are therefore quite different from the issue of solidarity between richer and poorer 
regions in the EC that has found expression in the structural funds and the cohesion 
fund. 
Apart from the foregoing theoretical critiques of the externality arguments, it 
appears that from an empirical point of view also too much attention has been given 
to arguments suggesting a need for fiscal coordination on the basis of economic 
externalities and international spillovers of non-cooperative fiscal policies. We would 
argue that the estimated size of these spillover effects is small enough and the 
ambiguity about their sign large enough, to render it very unlikely that a systematic 
bias towards excessive deficits might result from such externalities. 
For what concerns the size of the international spillovers from fiscal policy in the 
EC, the available evidence suggests that these are going to be small since the typical 
European country (with an important exception for the case of Germany) is too small 
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to affect world interest rates or economic activity in other European countries. Both 
the economic models used by the Community for fiscal policy simulation exercises (the 
MULTIMOD model and the QUEST model) and other models (such as the variant of 
the MSG model developed in Roubini [1991]) imply that under the ERM the output 
and interest rate effects of a fiscal expansion are confined mostly to the originating EC 
country and that the international spillover effects will be insignificant. For example, 
the MULTIMOD model used by the Commission to analyze the benefits and cost of 
monetary union (see Commission of the European Communities [1990]) implies that, 
under a full EMU monetary regime, the first year effect of an increase in government 
expenditures in France equal to 1 % of French GDP will be 0.80% of GDP in France 
but insignificant in the other EC countries (--0.08 in Germany, --0.04% in Italy and 
--0.05% in the U.K.). While the French fiscal policy has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect 
on the other EC countries' output, the size of the effect is so insignificant that it 
should be of little concern to France's European partners. Moreover, the simulation 
results suggest that while the output effects might be marginally beggar-thy-neighbor, 
the spillover of fiscal policy on foreign inflation is negative (i.e. a fiscal expansion 
reduces inflation in the partner countries). Similar results to those of France are 
obtained for the other EC countries other than Germany. 
Four further points should be made about international fiscal spillovers. First, in 
addition to being small, the spillover effects of fiscal policy are also uncertain: a 
number of econometric and simulation models (such as those used in the comparative 
Brookings study by Bryant et al.[1990]) suggest that even the sign of the spillover 
effect is likely to be ambiguous. Second, since the spillover may be positive or 
negative depending on which variable and which model one considers, it is not possible 
to determine a priori whether non~ooperative fiscal policies will lead to excessive fiscal 
deficits rather than to excessive surpluses. Third, the simulation exercises usually 
imply that the original fiscal expansion is matched some time down the line by an 
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increase in taxes that guarantees the solvency of the government. Non-cooperative 
fiscal policy in these exercises therefore cannot, by construction, lead to permanent 
"excessive" fiscal deficits since the intertemporal budget constraint of the government 
has to be satisfied in the long run. 
Fourth, and most important, Germany is the only European country large enough 
to cause significant international fiscal spillovers. This is reinforced by its leadership 
role in the ERM which. effectively requires it, unlike the other ERM members, to 
sterilize international reserve flows. In this regard, the econometric results derived in 
model used by the Commission to analyze the benefits and costs of monetary union 
(see Commission of the European Communities [1990]) need to be considered carefully. 
Such simulations suggest that, under a fully cooperative and symmetric EMU monetary 
regime, the first year effect of an increase in government expenditures in Germany 
equal to 1% of German GDP will be 0.80% of GDP in Germany but essentially equal 
to zero in France, Italy and the in the U.K. Under the hypotheses of the model, 
trade and interest rate linkages offset each other almost completely. 
What explains these results is that a fiscal expansion m Germany is 
complemented with a significant monetary expansion by the Bundesbank and some 
monetary contraction by the other ERM members, in order to maintain exchange rate 
parities within the ERM. In the more realistic case of an asymmetric EMS or EMU 
where the burden of pegging the exchange rate is not carried by the leader country 
(Germany) but rather by the followers ( the other ERM members), a fiscal expansion in 
Germany, unaccompanied by a German monetary expansion, would put pressure on the 
nominal and real exchange rates, lead to an increase EC interest rates and force all the 
other EMS countries to contract monetary policy in order to peg their ERM parities. s2 
In this case, German fiscal expansion causes a recession in all other ERM countries. 
According to the MULTIMOD model, a German fiscal expansion of 2% of GDP 
could lead, in the first year, to a 1% increase in German GDP and a fall in French, 
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Italian and British GDP equal to 0.25% of GDP. Even stronger effects are found by 
Roubini [1991], using a variant of the MSG simulation model: in an asymmetric EMS, 
a permanent German fiscal expansion equal to 1% of GDP reduces GDP in the other 
ERM countries by over 1% of GDP in the first year; after five years, the other ERM 
countries' output is still 0.5% below the baseline. Similarly, in an asymmetric EMU, a 
monetary contraction by the leader {Germany) forces the other ERM countries to 
contract their money supplies in order to maintain their ERM parities. This monetary 
contraction, in turn, leads to a transitory output fall in all ERM countries. In the 
simulations by Roubini [1991], a permanent German monetary contraction equal to 1% 
reduces GDP in the other ERM countries by an average of 0.8% of GDP in the first 
year as they contract their money supplies to peg their parities with the Deutsche 
Mark; this output contraction is transitory and disappears after about seven years. 
Since the recent German macroeconomic policy mix has been characterized by a 
significant fiscal expansion accompanied by a monetary contraction aimed at preventing 
excessive inflation, the ensuing rise in nominal and real interest rates put significant 
pressure on the ERM exchange rates. Given the asymmetric nature of the present 
ERM regime, where the leader has not been willing to loosen its monetary policy in 
order to take the pressure off the ERM parities, the German policy mix has inflicted 
serious output and unemployment costs on all ERM members. 
However, for ERM countries other than Germany, the evidence suggests that 
externalities due to non-cooperative fiscal policy cannot explain why there should be a 
systematic bias towards "excessive" deficits nor why the Community should be 
concerned about these "externalities". 
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ID.6. A BIAS TOWARDS "EXCESSIVE" DEFICITS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL 
EXTERNALITIES? 
ID.6.1. Politically motivated fiscal deficits. 
Explanations of "excessive" deficits based on international economic externalities 
(whether efficiency-related or distributional) are unsatisfactory. It then follows that; if 
a structural bias towards "excessive deficits" exists, there must be some political 
distortion that leads some governments, even in a closed economy, to follow systematic 
policies of fiscal deficits in excess of what can be considered economically optimal . 
One could then attempt to rationalize the EC rules for fiscal constraint with the idea 
that discretionary fiscal policy leads to politically motivated "excessive" deficits. 
In the absence of significant international spillovers, however, such politically 
motivated excessive national government deficits would not require international 
coordination through a centrally determined, monitored and enforced set of uniform 
fiscal norms. Each nation could separately legislate and enact nation-specific rules 
restricting its government's ability to borrow. Only if, despite the absence of 
significant international externalities, a foreign or supranational agency is able to impose 
and enforce rules that the individual nation cannot impose on itself, would there be a 
case for Maastricht-like fiscal rules. Even then, one would not expect to find that the 
rule specifies the same two numbers for all member states. 
In general, the empirical evidence is consistent with the view that such a bias 
towards deficits exists in a number of countries. For example, the formal tests 
discussed in Section II of this paper show that the path of fiscal policy followed by a 
few EC countries might not be consistent with long term solvency of their public 
sector. Similarly, the existence of large primary gaps in a number of countries suggests 
that a change in the present path of fiscal policies will be required to avoid persistent 
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(and eventually unsustainable) increases in debt ratios. 53 
What can therefore explain excessive deficits? A class of recent explanations 
elaborates the idea of "political" distortions that lead governments to adopt systematic 
policies of excessive fiscal deficits. There are at least four classes of political models of 
fiscal deficits: 1. The public choice approach of Buchanan; 2. Models of government 
weakness and decentralized government; 3. Models of strategic public debt choice; 4. 
Political business cycle models. 54 
The empirical evidence on these political models of deficits is growing and not 
discouraging. Roubini and Sachs [1989a, 1989b), using panel data on a sample of 15 
OECD countries, find that political instability (as proxied by variables such as the type 
of government (single party majority, presidential, presidential with divided government, 
multi-party coalition, minority) or low average duration of the government lead to 
higher inflation-adjusted budget deficits. Roubini [1991] and Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini (1991] find similar evidence that high government turnover is associated with 
deficits in developing countries. More recently, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini [1991] 
have found similar evidence showing the effects of weak government and short coalition 
duration on fiscal deficits in the industrial countries. Expanding on the evidence in 
Sachs and Roubini, Alesina, Cohen and Roubini [1992] find that both political 
instability and electoral factors (such as those stressed by the political business cycle 
models) explain fiscal deficits. Alesina, Cohen and Roubini [1993] find some evidence 
that, in addition to the aforementioned variables, the partisan nature of a government 
matters for inflation-corrected fiscal deficits: in particular, left-wing governments tend 
to run larger fiscal deficits than right-wing ones. Similar evidence by Alogoskoufis and 
Philippopoulos [1991] for partisan effects on inflation rates in Greece might help explain 
the high level of nominal fiscal deficits in that country.55 
In summary, the evidence supports the idea that political factors play a role in 
explaining biases towards budget deficits. Specifically, the political instability and the 
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government weakness that prevail in Italy are important factors in explaining the fiscal 
stalemate in that country and its inability to adjust its fiscal balances. Similarly, 
partisan bias and conflict and a high degree of political polarization appear to be 
important factors in the large fiscal deficits of Greece. However, the argument 
regarding the role of government instability and weakness also works the other way 
around. In particular, the drastic fiscal adjustment in the early 1980s in countries such 
as Belgium, Ireland and Denmark began after elections (in 1982) that led to a new and 
stable political majority. Similarly, the improvement in the fiscal conditions of 
countries such as Spain and Portugal has occurred under the rule of stable one-party 
majorities (socialist in Spain, conservative in Portugal). 
ill.6.2. An argument in favor of the external enforcement of rules of fiscal discipline. 
The existence of political factors making for a tendency towards excessive deficits 
may seem to provide support for fiscal rules such as those agreed to in Maastricht. 
When one considers the experience of the ERM, it seems quite clear that the existence 
of the exchange rate constraint did affect the political and social debate in the early 
1980s in countries such as Italy and France and strengthened the bargaining position of 
political and economic groups favoring anti-inflationary policies. In Italy, the drive 
towards a reduction in wage indexation (recently completed successfully) appears to 
have been helped by the ERM constraint. In France, after the go-alone socialist 
expansionary policies of the 1981-83, the contractionary fiscal and monetary policies 
followed after 1983 were sold to the French public as the only ones that would allow 
France to remain in the ERM and in Europe. 
In a similar way, the Maastricht fiscal constraints might be expected to affect the 
political game regarding the need for fiscal austerity in countries such as Italy and 
Greece. With the penalty for failure to meet the fiscal criteria of eventual exclusion 
from monetary union looming over the political horizon in Italy, the Maastricht stick 
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(rigid fiscal rules) and carrot (participation in the monetary union) will figure 
prominently in the political debate over fiscal adjustment in that country. The same 
stick and carrot are likely to affect the political debate and the fiscal policies adopted 
in other EC countries that are presently following policies of excessive deficits. 
Even if the ERM rules did have the effects attributed to them here and even if 
the Maastricht rules will do so in the future, the necessity of these rules for these 
outcomes has not been demonstrated. One could argue that, while political uncertainty 
and instability in the domestic polity may be a source of a systematic bias towards 
budget deficits, reputational forces might be enough to support cooperative rules 
conducive to fiscal discipline in a democratic institutional framework where different 
governments and parties alternate in power. Even if an "external" mechanism were to 
be necessary to support co-operative behavior among the domestic players, the word 
"external" in game theory refers to an arrangement, institution or agent outside the 
original set of players. It does not need to be "external" in the sense of foreign or 
supranational. Domestic constitutional arrangements are an example. It is therefore 
not obvious that an external enforcement mechanism such as the Maastricht guidelines 
supported by EC sanctions is necessary to enforce national fiscal discipline 56. 
Consider, for the sake of argument, the case where a cooperatively agreed upon 
national budget rule has the following conservative features: over the course of a 
normal business cycle, the inflation-and real output growth-corrected57 current budget of 
the general government must be balanced or in surplus 58. Inflation-and real output 
growth-corrected, structural (or cyclically adjusted) current fiscal deficits (surpluses) will 
be run during recessions (cyclical expansions) and periods of transitorily high (low) 
government spending. Such a rule would keep the expected net public debt-GDP ratio 
from rising over business cycle length time intervals59• While inevitably arbitrary, such 
a rule would be less objectionable than the Maastricht rules. Game theory suggests 
that, in some circumstances, reputational forces might be enough to sustain cooperative 
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behavior: if discount rates are not too high, if the benefits from cooperation are large 
and the short term benefits from cheating small and if the true state of the economy 
can be ascertained easily, a cooperative agreement could be sustainable as a political 
equilibrium without the need for an external agent to enforce it. 
In reality the presence of systematic and unavoidable uncertainty is likely 
seriously to weaken these reputational forces60: 
1. Output shocks might be observed with delay and measurement errors. 
2. There might be legitimate disagreements about the transitory or permanent 
nature of output and spending disturbances. 
3. The distinction between current and capital expenditure is not clear-cut. 
4. There are many implicit, intangible and often contingent future liabilities of the 
public sector (as in the case of the liabilities of the social security system) that will 
give rise to uncertain future spending flows that need bear no relation to the current 
values of these flows, or even to their average values over the cycle. 
5. As the U.S. experience with Gramm-Rudman targets shows, rigid fiscal targets 
can be circumvented by putting off-budget certain spending items (see for example the 
S&L bail-out and the FDIC refinancing). An external arbitrator and settlement 
enforcer is required in case of irresolvable disagreement. 
6. Any real-world rule, even a contingent one, can be no more than an 
incomplete contract that cannot cover the myriads of contingencies that might occur in 
reality. 
In the presence of such pervasive uncertainty, the reputational mechanisms 
supporting fiscal discipline are likely to break down and institutions become necessary 
to monitor agreements, interpret rules, adjudicate controversies, and enforce the agreed 
rules through sanctions against deviant agents. Where such a deus ex machina can be 
found is, unfortunately, not part of the theory. 61 
Under these circumstances, the EC (or one of its organs such as the Commission) 
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can play the enforcement role, providing external surveillance and monitoring of the 
fiscal balances of the member countries. The constant monitoring can strengthen the 
domestic incentives for fiscal discipline. However, such surveillance would be toothless 
without the presence of explicit sanctions aimed at punishing deviant countries. In the 
period leading up to monetary union, the sanction of exclusion from such a union 
appears a stronger incentive to follow disciplined fiscal policies that the rather tepid 
sanctions once EMU is a fact. 
IV. CONCLUSION: HOW TO LIVE WITH THE FISCAL CONVERGENCE 
CONDITIONS OF MAASTRICHT. 
It may be that the whole issue of EMU will be made moot by a widespread 
collapse of political support for it. The turmoil in the foreign exchange markets during 
the week leading up to the narrow "yes" vote in the French referendum on Maastricht 
has created doubts as to the likelihood, feasibility and desirability of monetary union. 
There is growing awareness that the 12 EC members are still characterized by 
persistent, even if reduced, divergences in macroeconomic policies and policy objectives 
and that they continue to be buffeted by asymmetric disturbances. 
The United Kingdom, faced with a choice between maintaining a seriously 
overvalued currency at the cost of record high real interest rates and a persistent 
recession or suspending its membership in the ERM and pursuing its own monetary and 
interest rate policy, has for now opted for the second road. Alone among the major 
EC countries, EMU continues to receive widespread political support in Italy. In 
Germany, the support for the Maastricht Treaty by the Kohl government appears to 
clash with the subtle and not-so-subtle attempts by the Bundesbank to undermine it. 
The decision of the Bundesbank effectively to maintain its tight monetary policy even 
when confronted with the currency crisis that this policy stance contributed to, confirms 
that the only form of European monetary union acceptable to the German central bank 
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is one where the objective of German price stability overrides all other policy 
objectives. 
A plausible, if Machiavellian, interpretation of the advocacy by the Bundesbank of 
the infeasible debt norms of Maastricht is that these are expected and intended to 
delay EMU, and especially the move to a common currency, until well into the next 
century and perhaps to prevent it from taking place altogether. One motivating factor 
could be the first universal law of organizational behavior, according to which no 
organization ever cooperates enthusiastically and wholeheartedly with a venture that, if 
successful, will result in its demise62. This of course applies to all national central 
banks that would lose their formal autonomy under EMU. In addition, German 
monetary officials must realize that they will never be as influential in the ESCB and 
the ECB following EMU and the adoption of a common currency, as they are today 
under the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS with the D-Mark. By contrast, 
French and Italian monetary officials can anticipate an increase in their influence 
following EMU, after many frustrating years of subordination to the Bundesbank in the 
EMR. The same sentiments may also explain in part the official French and Italian 
eagerness to have the Maastricht Treaty ratified and the monetary union process 
continued successfully. 
The Italian enthusiasm for EMU, however, clashes with the objective fact that 
this country is very far from satisfying the minimal economic conditions required for 
joining a monetary union and staying in it. Italy's fiscal deficit is out of control: its 
debt to GDP ratio exceeds 100%; when it left the ERM last September, its real 
exchange rate was seriously overvalued by five years of fixed nominal rates despite 
positive inflation differentials vis a vis the rest of the EMR countries; its political 
system appears paralyzed. The crisis of the Lira in the week before the French 
referendum has at least had the positive effect of shaking any remaining misplaced 
self-confidence, optimism and policy inertia that five years of exchange rate stability 
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may have created. Whether the shock waves set off by the devaluation of the Lira 
and the suspension of Italy's ERM membership will break the political stalemate and 
lead to a serious fiscal adjustment remains, however, an open issue. 
If the Maastricht Treaty is eventually ratified and EMU remains alive, the EC 
member states are faced with a number of options. If by the end of 1996 at least 6 
countries are judged to have satisfied the membership criteria, these six would, 
presumably, become the nucleus of the monetary union. If by the end of 1997 the 
date for the beginning of the third stage (full monetary union) has not been set, the 
third stage will start on 1 January 1999, with the list of qualifiers established no later 
than 1 July 1998. After January 1, 1999, non-member states will join as soon as they 
are judged to meet the criteria. The United Kingdom alone can choose to meet the 
criteria without becoming a full member. 
Clearly, the fiscal criteria, and especially the debt criterion, will be one of the 
sticking points. If both the deficit and the debt reference values are interpreted 
strictly, Greece, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and even the Netherlands will not be able to 
join the monetary union by the end of 1996. The Netherlands might meet the debt 
criterion by the end of 1998 with a significant (at least 2.5% of GDP) increase in the 
primary surplus from the 1991 level of 2% of GDP. Greece, Italy, Belgium and 
Ireland are unlikely to satisfy the debt reference value until well into the next decade. 
Assuming that full economic and monetary union remains the objective, how 
should the fiscal criteria be applied in the evaluation of potential members' fitness to 
join? 
We have argued in this paper that the fiscal convergence criteria designed to 
eliminate or prevent "excessive deficits" are badly motivated and poorly designed and 
apt to lead to unnecessary hardship if pursued mechanically. The debt criterion is 
especially likely to cause avoidable pain. There is no case for restricting the debt-GDP 




numerical limit for 12 heterogeneous countries. 
Given the inherited debt-GDP ratio, the achievement of government solvency 
clearly puts a lower bound on the long-run average value of the primary surplus-GDP 
ratio. It is also evident, that it does not . constitute a credible policy to justify 
persistent primary deficits which would be inconsistent with solvency if maintained 
indefinitely, with the promise of large compensatory primary surpluses at some 
unspecified time in the distant future. 
Given an inflation target, a lower bound on the long-run average primary 
surplus-GDP ratio implies an upper bound on the long-run average interest-inclusive 
deficit-GDP ratio. Such an upper bound is of course consistent with cyclical variations 
in the deficit and with temporary increases in the deficit above the upper limit on its 
long-run average value reflecting transitory (but not necessarily cyclical) spending 
increases or reductions in the revenue base. 
The "golden rule" of government financing is based on two fallacies. The first is 
that consumption loans to the public sector are intrinsically undesirable. The second is 
that government investment does · not, in the long run, constitute a drain on the 
government budget because, directly or indirectly, it generates higher future primary 
surpluses equal in present discounted value to the investment outlays. However, the 
returns on sector investment projects (even socially desirable ones) need not accrue in 
the form of cash returns that are appropriated by the government. There is no 
substitute for the careful consideration of the current and future cash flow implications 
of public sector investment projects. 
Since the achievement of neither fiscal target is necessary in order to satisfy the 
inflation, interest rate and exchange rate convergence criteria for EMU, one is left to 
wonder about the political reasons for their inclusion in the Treaty and its protocols. 
The Bundesbank was, after all, not a signatory to the Treaty. Could it be true that 
"They reflect not economic logic, but a mixture of German horror at the Italian 
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national debt, and Dutch Puritanism ( always the most extreme in my experience) - a 
grim combination." as Anthony Harris [1992] argued recently? 
Of the two numerical targets, the 60% debt-GDP ratio will have to be ignored 
( or interpreted so loosely that it amounts to the same thing) if massive unnecessary 
fiscal deflations in Italy, Greece, Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands are to be 
avoided. Pursuing the 3% deficit-GDP ratio in a gradualist manner will be painful 
only for Italy and Greece, moderately painful for Belgium and Portugal and relatively 
painless for the rest. 
The adoption and centralized enforcement of the deficit norm may be potentially 
helpful for a country like Italy whose government appears, for reasons that are not well 
understood, to receive from international agreements a transplant of fiscal backbone 
that it cannot obtain through domestic political commitments. In a similar manner, 
Portugal currently appears to achieve an injection of anti-inflationary discipline from 
membership in the ERM, the way France did in the eighties. 
Both fiscal norms appear largely irrelevant for France, Germany, the UK and 
Luxembourg, countries that already satisfy them or will be able to meet them without 
excessive effort. They also appear irrelevant for Greece but for the opposite reason. 
Greece has not yet shown a sign of durable fiscal rectitude, regardless of international 
or domestic commitments. 
Countries like Belgium, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands, where appropriate 
fiscal retrenchment has been under way for some time, should be allowed to ignore the 
debt norm and pursue the deficit norm in a gradualist manner. 
As regards the transitional output and unemployment cost of a concerted attempt 
by the eleven (until September 1992, now nine) ERM members to meet the deficit 
criterion by end-1996 or end-1998, a lot will depend on the . stance of EC-wide 
monetary policy ( effectively controlled by the Bundesbank when all major countries 
participate in the ERM). The current high nominal and real interest rates in Europe 
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are driven by two factors: first, high real rates reflecting European savings-investment 
imbalances caused by the transformations in Eastern Europe and the German deficit 
financing of the East German economy reconstruction; second, a very restrictive 
monetary stance of the Bundesbank driven by its concern about the increase in German 
inflation associated with the East German reconstruction and consumption boom. This 
German policy mix has significantly increased the real interest burden of the public 
debt in the EC, especially in countries with high debt-GDP ratios such as Italy, 
Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands. It has also deepened the recession in the 
non-German ERM member countries and contributed to cyclical increases in their 
public sector deficits. 
The reconstruction and consumption boom associated with German unification 
implied the need for an appreciation of the German real exchange rate. This would 
probably have been true to some extent even if the spending increase had been 
tax-financed. Deficit financing reinforces the effect. The required real appreciation can 
in principle be accomplished either through a nominal revaluation of the D-Mark (or, 
equivalently, through a nominal devaluation of the other ERM currencies) or through a 
temporary excess of the German inflation rate over the inflation rates of the other 
ERM countries. When the Bundesbank refused to accept the inflation option, the need 
for an eventual ERM realignment became inescapable. The timing was of course 
influenced by the "exogenous" shock of the French referendum. 
The inflexibility of the Bundesbank also gives cause for future concern, should 
Maastricht get back on track. For a given level of real output, a decrease in real and 
nominal interest rates resulting from the fiscal contraction required by Maastricht 
increases the demand for real money balances. In the absence of empirically 
implausible degrees of general price level flexibility, a recession is unavoidable unless 
the Bundesbank accommodates with a one-off increase in the nominal money stock the 
lower interest rates associated with the fiscal contraction and the disappearance of 
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exchange rate realignment risk. An institution with the conservative monetary 
reputation of the Bundesbank is ideally placed to engineer a recession-preventing 
once-and-for-all increase in the level of the nominal money stock without this fueling 
private sector fears of inflationary sustained future increases in the rate of growth of 
the nominal money stock. Given the past, inward-looking and inflexible record of the 
Bundesbank, however, it is doubtful that their ability to act is matched by wisdom to 
act. 
What are the options for a nation that does not meet the convergence criteria by 
the end of 1998? The first is to keep on trying until the conditions for membership 
are met. This would presumably involve adopting a unilaterally fixed exchange rate 
regime vis a vis the ECU, the common currency of the full members of EM;U. If the 
full members perceive a good-faith effort by the candidate member, the latter's fixed 
exchange rate with the ECU could even be managed cooperatively. 
The second option for a country that fails ( or expects to fail) to meet the 
Maastricht criteria by the end of 1998 is to "go it alone" and manage its exchange 
rate so as to best serve its perception of its national interest, without any further 
attempt to satisfy the criteria for full membership. This could of course be the option 
chosen by (or forced upon) all current ERM members if the Treaty is not delivered 
from its current state of limbo. 
What would be the economic consequences of a failure to move to a common 
currency? Compared with a system of credibly fixed exchange rates between national 
currencies, the benefits from a common currency are small. These benefits would 
consist in the saving of transaction costs associated with the replacement of several 
national currencies by the ECU, and in the opportunity for competing somewhat more 
effectively with the Yen and the US dollar as international reserve and vehicle 
currencies. For individual member states the distribution of the internal and external 
seigniorage of the ESCB-ECB is also important. The costs and benefits of the 
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non-monetary aspects of economic union (the single market, economic aspects of the 
protocol on social policy) are independent of the success or failure of monetary union. 
However, the main benefits of a monetary union possibly consist in the discontinuous 
gain in credibility for countries subject to an inflation bias. One should therefore not 
compare a monetary union with a system of credibly fixed exchange rates but rather 
with a system of partially credible fixed rates with a realignment option. 
The costs of a common currency are non-negligible. These consist mainly in the 
costs of any system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates in comparison with a fixed 
exchange rate regime that allows for realignments or with a floating rate system. The 
larger and less open member states lose a mechanism that enables them to achieve 
·necessary changes in international relative prices and costs more rapidly and with lower 
costs than would be possible through variations in relative national nominal costs and 
prices. No-one has convincingly demonstrated that the eleven ERM members (or even 
the nine) form an "optimal currency area"; if anything, recent empirical work by 
Eichengreen [1991] and Eichengreen and Bayoumi [1992] and Von Hagen and Neumann 
[1992] suggests the opposite. 
In addition, each member state, large or small, loses the opportunity of pursuing 
an optimal nationally differentiated inflation policy. Since the EC members differ 
greatly in their ability to levy non-inflation taxes, this restriction on the national fiscal 
policy arsenals could be of some relevance for a few countries. 
With a common currency, national exchange rate adjustments and nationally 
differentiated monetary policy disappear from the stabilization arsenal. The importance 
of flexibility in the use of the remaining national stabilization instrument, national 
fiscal policy, is correspondingly enhanced. Debt and deficit ceilings impair that 
flexibility and with it each member state's ability to respond to nationally differentiated 
shocks. 
There are non-economic arguments for EMU. The move to a common currency 
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is an important step in the European federalist agenda, and one might be in favor of it 
because it represents a strengthening of supranational European institutions. This, 
however, raises the important issue of sequencing. Historically, no political entity 
whose degree of political integration was not at least that of a confederation, has 
succeeded in maintaining a common currency.63 The level of political integration in the 
EC still falls well short of that of a confederation, let alone that of a federation. It 
may not be wise to attempt monetary union again before further political integration 
has taken place. 
The economic case for EMU is by no means overwhelming. If there are no 
sizable political gains to be set against the economic price of transitional fiscal deflation 
and permanently reduced fiscal flexibility, the cost of the alternative to 
EMU-continued national monetary autonomy for those who want it and continuing the 
current ERM-DM zone for the rest-may not seem unbearable. 
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General Goverrment Net Lending (as a share of GDP) 
61-70 71-80 81-90 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Belgillll -1.5 -5.1 -8.8 -2.2 -3.2 -3.3 -2.7 -4.8-3.7 -5.6 
Denmark 1.3 0.9 -2.5 4.1 3.9 3.9 5.2 3.1 -1.4 -0.2 
Germany 0.4 -1.9 -1.9 0.4 0 -0.4 1.3 -1.2 -5.5 -3.3 
Greece NA NA -12.9 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Spain NA -0.6 -4.6 0.7 -0.5 1.1 0.2 00.3 -0.3 
France 0.4 -0.5 -2.3 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 -2.4 -0.7 
Ireland -3.6 -8.4 -9.3 -4.3 -4.2 -4. 1 -4.6 -8.2 -12.5 -8.6 
Italy -2.3 -7.6 -11.2 -3.3 -4.8 -7 -6.5 -6.4 -10.6 -8.1 
Luxembourg 1.8 2.6 2.3 3.2 2.6 2.3 3.8 5.3 1.1 2 
Netherlands -0.8 -1.9 -5.8 -1.2 -1 0.8 -0.2 -2.9-0.4 -2.6 
Portugal NA NA -7.9 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
United Kingdom -0.6 -3 -1. 7 3 1.3 -1.3 -2.7 -3.8 -4.5 -4.9 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Belgillll -5.6 -6.1 -7.3 -9.2 -12.8 -11. 1 -11. 5 -9 -8.5 -9.1 
Denmark -0.5 -0.3 -1. 7 -3.3 -6.9 -9.1 -7.2 -4 .1 -2 3.4 
Germany -2.3 -2.4 -2.5 -2.8 -3.6 -3.3 -2.5 -1.9 -0.9 -1.3 
Greece NA NA NA NA -11 -8.3-7.7 -10 -13.8 -12.6 
Spain -0.6 -1. 7 -1.6 -2.6 -3.9 -5.6 -4.8 -5.4 -6.9 -6 
France -0.8 -2.1 -0.8 0 -1.9 -2.8 -3.2 -2.8 -2.9 -2.7 
Ireland -7.6 -9.7 -11.4 -12.7 -13.4 -13.8 -11.8 -9.8 -11 .2 -11 .2 
Italy -7 -8.5 -8.3 -8.6 -11.4 -11.3 -10.6 -11.6 -12.5 -11. 7 
Luxembourg 3.3 5 0.7 -0.4 -3.5 -1 2 3.4 5.3 3.5 
Netherlands -1.8 -2.8 -3.7 -4 -5.5 -7.1 -6.4 -6.3 -4.8 -6 
Portugal NA NA NA NA -9.3 -10.4 -9 -12 -10. 1 -7.2 
United Kingdom -3.2 -4.4 -3.3 -3.4 -2.6 -2.5 -3.3 -4 -2.8 -2.4 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Belgillll -7. i -6.9 -6.7 -5.7 -6.2 -5.9 
Denmark 2.4 0.5 -0.5 -1.5 -2.0 -2.1 
Germany -1.8 -2.1 0.2 -1.9 -3. 1 -3.4 
Greece -12.2 -14.4 -18.3 -20.4 -16.5 -13.2 
Spain -3.2 -3.3 -2.7 -4 -4.4 -4.3 
France -1.9 -1.8 -1.2 -1. 7 -1. 7 -2.0 
Ireland -9.1 -5.2 -3.5 -3.6 -2.3 -2.5 
Italy -11 -10.9 -10.1 -10.7 -10.2 -9.9 
Luxembourg 1.6 2.4 4.3 4.7 2.5 2.6 
Netherlands -6.6 -5.2 -5.2 -5.3 -3.9 -4.0 
Portugal -6.8 -5.4 -3.4 -5.8 -6.4 -5.4 
United Kingdom -1.3 1. 1 1.3 -0.7 -2.0 -4.9 
Source: European Economy, Conmission of the European Economies 
and European Economy Supplement A, Conmission of the European Economies 
Note: 1992 figures are forecasts. 






Gross Public Debt (as a share of GDP) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Belgiun 68.5 66.6 66.4 64.2 59.8 60.5 60 
Denmark 14.8 12.8 11.2 8.8 6 6.8 11.2 
Germany 18.4 18.4 18.8 18.6 19.6 25.1 29.1 
Greece 21.3 21.9 23.2 19.5 25.6 22.4 22.1 
Spain 15.3 15.8 14.4 12.6 12.1 12.5 13.1 
France 27.6 26.5 24 22.4 21.9 24.1 22.9 
Ireland 62.1 61.5 57.8 54.7 59.7 65.9 70.7 
Italy 44.8 50.5 56.5 58 55.6 63.8 58.6 
Luxembourg 28. 1 28.2 25.1 20.4 16.6 18. 1 16.4 
Netherlands 52.2 49.8 46.7 43.4 41.4 41.4 40.2 
Portugal NA NA NA 17.6 17.3 25.5 31.4 
United Kingdom 80 81.8 72 66.2 61.7 61.1 58.4 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Belgiun 63.9 68 71.4 76.9 89.4 97.5 107.4 112.6 
Denmark 15.5 23.6 29 39.3 52 64.5 74.3 79.8 
Germany 28.5 30 30.8 32.7 36.3 39.3 40.9 41.6 
Greece 22.4 29.4 29 28.8 34.2 36.1 41.2 53.2 
Spain 14.2 14 16.1 17.9 23.2 28.7 35.1 39.9 
France 22.7 23.2 24.2 24.6 23.9 27.9 29.5 43.8 
Ireland 67.5 69.6 75.2 76.8 81.7 87.2 97.3 104.8 
Italy 57.8 62.4 61.6 59 61.1 66.4 72 75 .1 
Luxembourg 16.6 15.4 14.2 13.8 14.4 14.5 14.8 15 
Netherlands 39.7 40.9 42.7 45.9 50.3 55.6 62 66.1 
Portugal 33.2 36.3 41 37.1 46.6 50.1 56 62.4 
United Kingdom 64.3 57.1 55.1 54.1 53.3 58.1 57.7 60.3 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Belgiun 119.8 124 131 132.4 128.4 127.3 129.4 129.6 
Denmark 76.8 69 65.8 66.1 65.6 66.4 66.7 65.8 
Germany 42.3 42.4 43.5 44.1 43 43.6 46.2 48.7 
Greece 62.6 65.2 72.9 80.4 85.8 93.7 96.4 99 
Spain 45.2 46.2 46.6 42.9 44.2 44.5 45.6 46.4 
France 45.5 45.7 47.3 47.2 47.4 46.6 47.2 47.5 
Ireland 108.5 120.8 122 120.4 110.1 103 102.8 100.4 
Italy 82 86.5 90.9 93.3 96 98.6 101.2 103.9 
Luxembourg 14 13.5 11.8 9.9 8.5 7.3 6.9 6.4 
Netherlands 69.7 71.6 75.4 77.7 77.9 78.3 78.4 79.5 
Portugal 70.9 69.5 72.9 75.2 72 68.2 64.7 62.7 
United Kingdom 58.9 57.7 55.7 50.3 45.1 42.8 43.8 45.6 
---------·-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: European Economy, Comnission of the European Economies. 






General Government Primary Balance (as a share of GDP) 
74-81 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Belgiun -1.9 -1.8 -2 1 2.3 2.3 
Derrnark 1.2 -3. 1 0.9 5.5 7.9 12.2 
Germany -1.3 -0.5 0.5 1. 1 2.1 1.7 
Greece NA -5 .1 -4.6 -5.4 -8.5 -6.8 
Spain -0.7 -4.6 -3.5 -3.3 -3.6 -2 
France 0.3 -0.8 -0.6 -0.1 0 0.2 
Ireland -4.9 -4.8 -2.5 -0.4 -0.9 -1.5 
Italy -3.9 -4.2 -3. 1 -3.6 -4.5 -3.2 
Luxembourg 2.6 0 3.1 4.5 6.4 4.6 
Netherlands 0.4 -1.9 -0.7 -0.3 1.5 0.2 
Portugal NA -4.9 -2.6 -4.9 -2.2 2 
.United Kingdom 0.7 2.5 1.4 0.9 2. 1 2.1 
EC 12 -0.9 ·1.4 -0.9 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Belgiun 3.6 3.4 3.9 5.2 4.7 5.4 
Derrnark 10.7 8.4 6.9 5.7 5.li 5.2 
Germany 1.1 0.7 2.9 0.7 -0.S -0.6 
Greece -5 -6.5 -10. 1 -8.4 -3.3 -0.5 
Spain 0.3 0 0.7 -0.5 0.2 -0.5 
France 0.9 1.6 1.4 1 .;· 1.3 
Ireland 0.6 4.2 5.6 4.8 6.0 5.8 
Italy -3 -2.7 -1. 1 -1 o.a 0.7 
Luxembourg 2.7 3.4 5. 1 5.4 3.2 3., 
Netherlands -0.5 0.9 0.7 0.6 2.0 2.2 
Portugal , 2.4 3.7 2.4 2., 3.0 
United Kingdom 3 5 5 2.6 1.2 -1.6 
EC 12 0.6 1.9 0.9 0.2 0.4 
·source: European Economy, Conmission of the European Economies. 
Note: 1992 figures are forecasts. 
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TABLE Il.4 
One-Period Primary Gaps For 1992 
* Real Real Public debt s1 GAP
1 
frowth rate interest rate 
%) (%) (% GDP) (% GDP) (% GDP) 
Germany 2.2 1.9 46.2 -0.1 0.5 
France · 2.3 4.4 47.2 1.0 -0.3 
Italy 2.0 5.7 101.2 3.7 3.0 
UK 2.0 3.1 43.8 0.5 2.1 
Belgium 2.1 5.4 129.4 4.2 -1.2 
Denmark 3.0 9.8 66.7 3.9 -1.3 
Greece 1.2 1.6 96.4 0.3 0.8 
Ireland 2.3 5.1 102.8 2.8 -3.0 
Netherlands 1.3 5.4 78.4 3.2 1.0 
Spain 3.1 3.2 45.6 0.0 0.5 
Portugal 1.7 3.0 64.7 0.8 -2.2 
Luxembourg 3.4 4.1 6.9 0.0 -3.1 
s* 1 is the one period ahead debt-GDP ratio stabilizing primary surplus-GDP ratio; 
GAP1 denotes the corresponding primary gap. Source: EC data and forecasts. 
TABLE Il.5 
Myopic Permanent Primary Gaps For 1992 
* Growth Real interest Public MGAPCDsoo 
rate rate debt ,,,_, 
~ lO) l 7oJ l 7o uLJYJ l io GDP) (% GDP)
f (tf \ fM\ In-I r,c,-...,...__\ 
Germany 3.0 5.0 46.2 0.9 1.5 
France 3.0 5.0 47.2 0.9 -0.4 
Italy 3.0 5.0 101.2 1.9 1.2 
UK 3.0 5.0 43.8 0.8 2.4 
Belgium 3.0 5.0 129.4 2.5 -2.9 
Denmark 3.0 5.0 66.7 1.3 -3.9 
Greece 3.0 5.0 96.4 1.9 2.4 
Ireland 3.0 5.0 102.8 2.0 -3.8 
Netherlands 3.0 5.0 78.4 1.5 -0.7 
Spain 3.0 5.0 45.6 0.9 1.4 
Portugal 3.0 5.0 64.7 1.2 -1.8 
Luxembourg 3.0 5.0 6.9 0.1 -3.0 
* Sui is the constant primary surplus-GDP ratio required for long-run solvency; 
U) 
GAP denotes the corresponding primary gap. Source: EC data and forecasts. 
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Tablell.6 
Differences between forecasts of primary surpluses for 1992 by EC and OECD 
s9iEC)-s92( OECD) 













* The difference between the EC and OECD forecasts of the primary balance inDenmark depends largely on whether interest receipts and royalties are
considered as current revenues (as in the EC data) or as negative interestpayments (as in the OECD data). 
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TABLE 11.7
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE DEBT WHEN THE DEFICIT TARGET IS MET? 
Scenarios: (a) (b) (c) (d) 
debt91 ¢91 def91 debt96 debt98 debt96 debt98
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
GE 46.2 7.8 2.9 47.6 47.9 49.8 51.1
F 47.2 4.3 1.7 46.1 45.7 50.6 51.8
It 101.2 8.8 10.2 97.1 96.1 92.9 90.2
UK 43.8 4.6 2.0 44.1 44.3 48.0 49.4
B 129.4 4.7 6.2 121.3 119.0 115.0 110.2
DK 66.7 4.0 2.0 64.1 63.2 65.9 65.6
GR 96.4 21.3 16.5 88.6 86.3 89.2 86.7
IR 102.8 5.1 2.3 90.9 86.8 94.2 91.3
NL 78.4 5.4 3.9 76.1 75.4 75.1 73.9s 45.6 9.5 4.4 52.9 55.1 49.4 50.6p 64.7 16.1 6.4 61.2 60.0 64.3 64.2
L 6.9 4.7 -2.5 -5.9 10.3 19.0 23.1 
EC 61.5 6.9 4.3 60.9 60.8 61.8 61.9 
Scenario (a). 1/J: starting from the 1991 value for nominal GDP growth, if 7/J
exceeds 5%, it declines at a constant exponential rate and reaches 5% by
the end of 1996. It stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise.
def: if the 1991 value of the deficit-GDP ratio exceeds 3%, def declines
at a constant exponential rate and reaches 3% by the end of 1996. It
stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise. The debt-GDP ratio at the end
of 1996 is calculated.
Scenario (b). Same as (a) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the final year.
Scenario (c). 7/J: if 7/J exceeds 5% in 1991, this value is reached immediately
in 1992 and maintained every year thereafter. It stays constant at its
1991 level otherwise.
def: if def exceeds 3% in 1991, this value is reached immediately in 1992
and maintained thereafter. It stays constant at its 1991 level otherwise.
Scenario (d). Same as (c) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the final year. 
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TABLE II.8 
lffl!T CONSTANT DEFICIT~DP RATIO TO GET TO THE DEBT TARGET? 
def91 The constant deficit-GDP ratio that would 
reduce the debt-GDP ratio to 60% under 
scenarios: 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
It 101.2 8.8 10.2 -3.2 -0.9 -4.2 -1.96 
B 129.4 4.7 6.2 -9.2 -5.4 -9.1 -5.3 
DK 66.7 4.0 2.0 1.5 1.8 1. 7 2.1 
GR 96.4 21.3 16.5 -0.2 1.9 -3.4 -1.4 
IR 102.8 5.1 2.3 -4.5 -2.1 -4.5 -2.2 
NL 78.4 5.4 3.9 -0.2 0.8 -0.3 0.7 p 64.7 16.1 6.4 1.5 1.8 1.7 2.1 
Scenario (a). 'I/;: starting from the 1991 value for nominal GDP growth, if 'I/J
exceeds 5%, it declines at a constant exponential rate and reaches 5% by the
end of 1996. It stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise. 
The value of the constant deficit-GDP ratio that would bring the debt-GDP 
ratio to 60% by the end of 1996 is calculated. 
Scenario (b). Same as (a) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the target date. 
Scenario ( c). ¢: if 'I/J exceeds 5% in 1991, the 5% is reached immediately in 1992 
and maintained thereafter. It stays constant at its 1991 value otherwise. 
The value of the constant deficit-GDP ratio that would bring the debt-GDP 
ratio to 60% by the end of 1996 is calculated. 
Scenario (d). Same as (c) but taking 1998 rather than 1996 as the target date. 
TABLE II.9 
lffl!T CONSTANT PRIIARY DEFICIT~DP RATIO TO GET TO THE DEBT TARGET? 
debt91 ¢91 primary The constant primary deficit-GDP ratio that 
deficit-GDP would reduce the debt-GDP ratio to 60% under 
ratio scenarios: 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
It 101.2 8.8 o.o -11.7 -9.6 -11.0 -8.6
B 129.4 4.7 -4.7 -17.8 -13.9 -17.6 -13.6
DK 66.7 4.0 -5.4 -2.8 -2.4 -2.9 -2.6GR 96.4 21.3 3.3 -11.5 -10.1 -9.9 -7.8IR 102.8 5.1 -6.0 -11.3 -8.8 -11.4 -8.9NL 78.4 5.4 -2.0 -5.8 -4.7 -5.7 -4.6p 64.7 16.1 -2.1 -2.8 -,2.4 -2.9 -2.6 
Scenarios: same as in Table II.8. We further assume a constant 5% real 
interest rate and a constant 3% growth rate of real GDP. 
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TABLE II.10 
lffi!T CONSTANT DEFICIT-GDP RA.TIO TO GET lliFVA.Y TO THE DEBT TA.IGET ? 
debt91 ¢91 def91 debt
* The constant deficit-GDP ratio that 
reduces the debt-GDP ratio 
halfway to 60% u_nder scenarios: 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
It 101.2 8.8 10.2 80.6 1.4 2.6 0.3 1.4 
B 129.4 4.7 6.2 94.7 -1.6 0.3 -1.5 0.5 
DK 66.7 4.0 2.0 63.4 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6
GR 96.4 21.3 16.5 78.2 3.9 5.0 0.6 1.6
IR 102.8 5.1 2.3 81.4 0.2 1.4 0.2 1.4
NL 78.4 5.4 3.9 69.2 1.8 2.3 1.7 2.2 
p 64.7 16.1 6.4 62.4 4.3 4.5 2.6 2.7 
Scenarios: same as in Table Il.8. However, the target debt-GDP ratio is now 
halfway between the 1991 value and 60%. debt* denotes this new target. 
TABLE II.11 
lffi!T CONSTANT PRIDRY DEFICIT-GDP RA.TIO TO GET lliFVA.Y TO THE DEBT TA.IGET? 
*debt91 ¢91 primary debt The constant primary deficit-GDP ra 
deficit that reduces the debt-GDP ratio 
1991 halfway to 60% under scenarios: 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
It 101.2 8.8 0.0 80.6 -7 .1 -6.1 -6.5 -5.2 
B 129.4 4.7 -4.7 94.7 -10.2 --8 .2 -9.9 -7.9 
DK 66.7 4.0 -5.4 63.4 -2.8 -2.4 -2.9 -2.6
GR 96.4 21.3 3.3 78.2 -7.4 -6.9 -5.9 -4.8
IR 102.8 5.1 -6.0 81.4 -6.6 -5.3 -6.7 -5.4
NL 78.4 5.4 -2.0 69.2 -3.7 -3.2 -3.6 -3.1 
p 64.7 16.1 -2.1 62.4 -2.4 -2.4 -1.9 -1.8 
Scenarios: same as in Table Il.10. The real interest rate is constant at 5% 
and the growth rate of real GDP is constant at 3%. 
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Table III.1. 
EC General Government Gross and Net Debt, in 1990. 





















































* Vest Germany. 
**On a SNA basis except for the UK and Greece where the data are based on
national methods. 
Sources: EC and OECD Economic Outlook. 
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FOOTNOTES 
We would like to thank Jeffrey Frankel, Rafael Repullo and the other participants inthe Economic Policy Panel Meeting of October 15/16 1992 in London, UK, forcomments on an earlier version of this paper. Willem Buiter did much of his work onthis paper while a Visiting Scholar in the Commodities and Special Studies Division ofthe Research Department of the IMF, during August 1992. The usual disclaimersapply with unusual force. 
1 A number of other papers have recently analyzed and discussed the case for tightfiscal rules in the context of EMU and presented arguments partly similar to thosein our paper. Among the recent important contributions are those by Bean [1992],Begg et. al. [1991], Eichengreen (1992] and Kenen [1992). 
2 "Uncoordinated and divergent national budgetary policies would underminemonetary stability and generate imbalances in the real and financial sectorsof the Community" (Delors Report (1989), page 16). 
3 For an detailed overview of this debate, see Voolley [1991]. Recentcontributions to the fiscal implications of Maastricht include Buiter [1992],Corsetti and Roubini [1992a] and Eichengreen [1992]. 
4 It does not, however, proscribe the "indirect" purchase of governmentsecurities in the secondary market by the future ECSB. Open marketoperations, foreign exchange market intervention and indeed domestic creditexpansion that ends up financing government deficits, remain possible, as longas any sales or purchases of government debt by the ECSB go through thesecondary market rather than straight between the government and the ECSB, andas long as they occur at the initiative of the independent ECSB. There is nosubstantive distinction between the government selling its debt to the privatesector and the central bank subsequently buying that debt from the privatesector and the government selling debt to the central bank directly. 
5 After the monetary union, if the Council decides that an excessive deficitexists, it will make fiscal recommendations to the member state (not to bemade public at first), establishing a deadline by which to take the necessarycorrective steps. If by this time-limit no effective action is undertaken,the recommendations are made public (presumably as a way to embarrass thedeviant country) and the member state is required to submit periodic reportsabout its adjustment efforts. Finally, if the fiscal imbalance persists, theCouncil may decide: a) to require the member state to publish additionalinformation before issuing debt; b) to invite the European investment bank toreconsider its lending policy towards that state; c) to require the memberstate to make a non-interest bearing deposit with the Community or d) toimpose a fine of "an appropriate size". While the threat of not being allowed tojoin the monetary union because of failing to meet the fiscal criterion would be astrong sanction against a country interested in joining EMU, the range of sanctionsconsidered for deviant countries after EMU is achieved appears to be quite mild.
6 These criteria are presented in Article 109j and explained in detail in theProtocol on the Convergence Criteria. Article 1 of this Protocol states thatthe price stability criterion "shall mean that a Member State has a priceperformance that is sustainable and an average inflation rate, observed over aperiod of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing MemberStates in terms of price stability". According to Article 4, "The criterion 
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on the convergence of interest rates ... shall mean that, observed over a periodof one year before the examination, a Member State has an average nominallong-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than two percentagepoints that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of·price stability". Article 3 requires a Member State to respect "the normalfluctuations margins ... of the European Monetary System without severe tensionsfor at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, theMember State· shall not have devalued its currency's bilateral central rateagainst any other Member State's currency on its ow initiative for the sameperiod". 
7 See for example the chapter on the implications for public finance of EMU inthe Commission of the European Communities (1991) document on EMU. 
8 For example, the Commission document on the "Economics of EMU" (Commission ofthe European Communities (1991)) discussed sustainability of debt under theassumption that the long term growth rate is going to be 3.0% for all memberstates except those whose GDP per capita is more than 25% below average forwhich growth is forecast to be 3.5% (these are Greece, Spain, Ireland andPortugal). 
9 German inflation (as measured by the GDP deflator) averaged 4.5% in the1974-83 period, 2.4% in the 1984-1989 period and accelerated to 3.4% and 4.3%in 1990 and 1991. 
10 See for example the Commission background study on monetary union and the1991 Annual Report in Commission of the European Communities [1991, 1992].
11 The share of the general government fixed capital formation in GDP was equalto 3.00% in 1990 and 1991 and averaged 3.027. in the 1974-1989 period. 
12 The failure of the Community to consider such a inflation correction leads togross mistakes in official EC documents measuring whether the EC countriessatisfy the "golden rule". For example, the study on budgetary policies inthe Community attached to the 1991 Annual Report of the Commission measuresgross saving as the difference between nominal net lending (as a% of GDP) andpublic investment (as a% of GDP). Then, high debt and/or high inflationcountries suchs as Italy, Greece, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal appear ashaving large (and sometimes huge) dissavings and a failure to satisfy the"golden rule" while a correct measure of savings would show in several casespositive savings. 
13 Since high debt countries such as Belgium, Ireland, Greece and Italy willonly gradually reduce their debt to the 60% level, a deficit target set interms of nominal deficit, implies that a very small fraction of their publicinvestment would be financed through borrowing even in the best scenario inwhich their inflation rate has been reduced to the 2% target. Real governmentsavings will be persistently positive. 
14 It should be observed that the high deficit figures in the 1970s wereinflated by the high nominal rates of interest associated with the highinflation rates of the post 1973 period, while the Maastricht reference valuesof 3% appear to be looking forward to a future of balanced growth with lowinflation. 
15 Formally, with an N-period real interest rate rN , an N-period growth rate of
real GDP gN ,and a debt-GDP ratio dt-l at the end of period t-1, the required 
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*N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio sN is given by: 
* (rN - gN) [1+gN]N
sN = [l+gNT] [l - i+rN ] dt-1
(l+gN) [1 - i+rN ] 
Vhen N = 1, this simplifies to 
* [rl - gl]
sl = 1 + g
1 
dt-1 
Ve also define the actual N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio, s~, to be that
constant primary surplus-GDP ratio whose present discounted value over N
periods is the same as the present discounted value of the actually planned or
expected primary surplus-GDP ratio over the next N periods. The actual primary
surplus-GDP ratio is denoted s. 
S 
a (rN-gN) ~[l+gN]k
N - l+gN]N ~ i+rN st-l+k
(l+gN)[l - [~ ] k=l 
The N-period primary gap in period t, GAP~ is defined as the excess of 
the required N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio, s:, over the actual N-period 
primary surplus-GDP ratio, s~ 
N * a
GAPt =SN - SN 
The N-period myopic primary gap in period t, MGAP~ is defined as the excess 
*of the required N-period primary surplus-GDP ratio, sN, over the actual
primary surplus-GDP ratio in period t, st : 
~..-,-, A nN __ *
1v1u.fl.r t = sN - st 
Vhen N = 1, the primary gap calculations simplify to: 








dt-l - st 
When N -+ CD, the permanent primary gap and the myopic permanent primary gap are
given by 
and 
- g]CD_ r CD CD
MGAP t = [ 1 + g dt-l - st
CD 
16 It should be observed that the significant deterioration of the Italian
fiscal conditions in early 1992 makes the forecast of a 0.7 surplus as
completely unrealistic. Even if the fiscal correction that is now being 
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considered is implemented, the best outcome for 1992 would not be more than azero primary balance. In this case the permanent primary gap for 1992 would be1.9% of GDP rather than 1.2%. 
11 Note that the effective interest rate on the debt of the consolidated generalgovernment and central bank will be below that of the general government alone,because of the zero interest rate bearing liabilities of the central bank ( the monetarybase). 
1s If the 1991 growth rate of nominal GDP is less than 5%, we assumed that the1991 value is maintained for each subsequent period; similarly, if the 1991deficit-GDP ratio is below 3%, we assume that the 1991 value is maintained foreach subsequent period. Ve therefore allow for deficit and inflationoverachievers. Ve repeated the simulation for the case where there are nooverachievers (i.e. all countries will move to 3% deficits and 5% nominal GDPgrowth by 1996 or 1998) but the results for what happens to the debt-GDPvalues were not very different. 
19 In high inflation countries, a serious dent in the debt to GDP ratio wouldresult by assuming that the deficit is reduced immediately to 3% but nominalincome growth stays at its initial 1991 high level (in most cases, however,the debt ratio would still be well above 60%: in the case of Italy, forexample, it would be 72.6% in 1998). Nonetheless, maintaining high nominalincome growth would be inconsistent with the inflation convergence criteria;therefore such an option for reducing the debt ratio is not allowed by theMaastricht rules. · 
20 Some of the arguments in this section have appeared in recent contributions such asBean [1992), Begg et. al. [1991), Eichengreen [1992) and Kenen [1992). 
21 The general government sector includes the central, state, provincial andlocal authorities as well as social security agencies. 
22 The familiar government budget constraint of the macroeconomic literatureconsiders the consolidated general government and central bank. Generalgovernment debt held by the central bank is netted out; central bank holdingsof foreign exchange reserves are treated as an asset of the consolidatedcentral bank and general government sector; base money, a central bankliability, becomes a (largely non-interest bearing monetary) liability of theconsolidated central bank and general government sector. 
23 In 1990 the ratio of monetary base to GDP ranged from lows of 4.0, 5.4 and5.6% for U.K., France and Denmark to highs to 17.8, 19.5, and 23.4% forGreece, Spain and Portugal. 
24 If the market value of the public enterprises differs from their continuationvalue in the public sector, things would be slightly more complicated, as thedistribution between the private and public sector of the valuation differencewould become important. Conditional on the distribution of the the valuationchange, the earlier point stands: Gross public debt would fall if debt isredeemed with the proceeds of the privatization, but there would be no furtherchange in public sector net worth; general government fiscal deficits would befurther reduced but the correct fiscal balances of the public sector would notchanged any further. 
2s If there are persistent national differences in productivity growth rates inthe non-traded goods sectors, national inflation differences can persist evenwith a common currency. 
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26 Even if the Maastricht Treaty and protocols are interpreted as ruling outcyclical variations in the government deficit centered on the reference valueof 3 percent of GDP, cyclical variations in the deficit would still bepermitted around an average value sufficiently below 3 percent of GDP. Anyattempt to get the average deficit sufficiently far below 3% of GDP toeliminate the risk that cyclical increases in the deficit will take it abovethe reference value would of course reinforce the contractionary bias of thedebt and deficit norms during the transitional period, discussed in Section
III.2. 
21 In calculating the social rate of return on a public sector investmentproject, one should of course allo~ for the costs associated with anyunavoidable distortionary financing of the project. 
28 Note that what Italy does fiscally, and how Germany responds with monetarypolicy, really dominates the outcomes for the EC as a whole. Only Italy hasboth the size and the disequilibrium to make an EC-wide fiscal impact andGermany of course determines monetary policy (short-term nominal interestrates) for the ERM area as a whole. 
29 See Mini stere de L'Economie et des Finances, Communique, July 29, 1992.
30 The French press release (Ministere de L'Economie et des Finances,Communique, July 29, 1992) correctly points out that some fiscal retrenchmentwould occur even in the absence of the Maastricht guidelines so that thecomparison between the Maastricht scenarios and the reference scenario isaffected by the choice of what the reference scenario would be.
31 See Ministere de L'Economie et des Finances, Communique, July 29, 1992,Liberation July 29, 1992 and International Herald Tribune, July 29, 1992. 
32 See Ministere de L'Economie et des Finances, Communique, July 29, 1992. Thisofficial French document presents the results of the IMF study for the growthrate of the EC in the 1993-1996 period under the two scenarios (relative tothe reference scenario). These are: 
93 94 95 96 Cumulative ouput loss 92-96Scenario I -0.8 +0.3 +0.3 +0.3 -0.4Scenario II -0.9 0.0 +0.1 +0.3 -0.8 
33 See International Herald Tribune, July 29, 1992. 
34 Note that under Scenario I interest rate differentials disappear and thecommon EC level of interest rates is established at the low German level.Vith real EC output above its reference value by 1995 and nominal interestrates lower than on the reference path, the demand for real money balancesmust be higher and the stock of real money balances must be larger towards theend of the simulation period under Scenario I than on the reference path.Vhile this increase in real money balances may have been engineered partly bythe disinflation at the beginning of the simulation period, it seems likelythat it reflects in part an increase in the nominal money stock relative tothe reference path. Ve therefore suspect that the smallness of the outputloss under Scenario I is due in part to the fact that, together with a fiscalcontraction, Scenario I also has an EC-wide monetary expansion. 
35 Like the IMF simulations, their simulation aimed to evaluate the additionalpolicy requirements needed to achieve the inflation and budget deficit targetswithin 5 years, and the implications of these policies for activity, interest 
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rates and exchange rates. Note also that, again as in the IMF simulations,the debt criterion has been written off as unrealistic for the high debt EC
countries. 
36 The simulation assumes that Germany pursues a 2% of GDP deficit target.
Interest rates come down by about 100 basis points in Germany over the 5-year
period and the interest rates of the other member countries converge to theGerman level. Here too, EC-wide monetary policy appears to be clearly
expansionary. 
37 The Italian debt-GDP ratio is effectively unchanged at about 105% at the endof 1996 and the Belgian (about 127%), Dutch (about 77%) and Irish (about 94%)debt-GDP ratios remain far above the Maastricht norm. 
38 The 0ECD simulation (like the IMF) has each national authority pursuing 2
objectives (the deficit-GDP ratio and the inflation rate) with only one "free"
instrument (fiscal policy) and another instrument (national monetary policy)
that, except for Germany, is effectively emasculated by the requirements of
the ERM. It is therefore not surprising that the achievement of the deficittargets is inconsistent with the simultaneous achievement of the inflation
targets, which are in fact overshot for a number of countries, including
France, Italy, Belgium, Ireland and Denmark. 
39 For the rest of the world, however, they report (contrary to what the
standard 2-country Mundell model would lead one to expect) a positive activityeffect from a fiscal retrenchment in Europe. · 
40 Note that inflation convergence is built into the base line, unlike the 0ECDsimulation. 
41 Short real rates rise by almost 700 basis points in 1992 (relative to base
line) and do not return to their base line level until 1996. Long real rates
(not shown in_the paper) ther~fore also incr~ase. All this occurs despi~e t~e· fact that nominal (ten year) interest rates in Italy fall. Monetary policy inItaly becomes contractionary to prevent a depreciation of the lira vis-a-visthe D-mark. At the end of 1996, the Italian debt-GDP ratio is effectively
unchanged, the effect of lower deficit-GDP ratios having been canceled out by
lower nominal income growth. The paper erroneously suggests that Italy
achieves its debt to GDP target by 1992. That is shown is the ratio of debt to
baseline GDP, not to GDP under the Maastricht simulation. 
42 International mutual insurance against this form of sovereign risk cannot beeffective due to "moral hazard" problems. 
43 In countries such as the United States and Canada, independent fiscal
authorities at the state and regional level are allowed for follow their ownbudgetary and deficit policies without that affecting or jeopardizing the
monetary union of the whole country. This was true even before a significantdegree of inter-state income redistribution and de-facto income insurance took
place through Federal transfer and tax programs (see Sachs and Sala-i-lartin
[1992] for a study of the importance of these income sharing arrangements
through the Federal budget in the USA). 
44 The proper response to sovereign default in the EC (pre- or post-EMU) is
simple. If, for instance, the German government were to default on its
obligations towards creditors resident in Germany, this would be a strictly
German problem; at the very least the defaulting government would pay at the
next election. If German government non-performance were at the expense of 
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creditors resident in other EIU countries, there should be no special
obligation for the non-German governments or for the supranational Community
agencies to compensate the losers. One would of course expect the other
national, regional or supranational authorities and the non-German private
sector to impose the usual sanctions for foreign sovereign default: no further
credit; current transactions on a cash-in-advance basis only; attachment of
German official assets abroad etc. 
45 With the goal of creating appropriate conditions for market discipline to work, ithas been argued that regulating banks and financial intermediaries so as to limit the
amount of public debt the:y can hold in their portfolios is an effective protection from
systemic risk (Begg et al. [1991]). 
46 Note, however, that these limits on independence also apply in spades to
today's most independent national central bank, the Bundesbank. It had at
most an advisory role in the process leading to the German government's early
support for EIU and a common currency. It was completely ignored when
Chancellor Kohl opted for accelerated monetary unification of the two Germanstates and played no role in the selection of the exchange rate between the
former Vest German and East German marks. 
47 The counterfactual to the borrowing is current tax financing using the mostbroadly-based, least distortionary taxes. The effect on the interest rates ofother countries is most easily appreciated when there are credibly fixedexchange rates or a common currency. It is also quite likely to be true,however, if the exchange rate floats. Exchange rate risk need not be affected
appreciably by the choice between current taxes and borrowing. 
48 Even if Bonzo's individual actions in the banana market cause only pecuniaryexternalities, it is clear that, even when we just consider public spending on
ordinary consumer goods (such as bananas) without technological external
effects, an argument can be still be made that the uncoordinated actions ofnational governments will not lead to Pareto efficient outcomes. Governmentsare (potentially) large players in the markets in which they operate, and willnot act competitively. Strategic interdependence is always present when we
deal with governments, and the equilibria of non-cooperative games will in
general be inefficient. They do not lie on the contract curve. Vith
government borrowing things are different. Government debt is not an
intrinsically valued consumption or producer good. Variations in the amount
of public debt outstanding influence the economy only to the extent that they
redistribute resources between heterogeneous economic agents. Non-cooperative
government financing games are games of pure redistribution, that is they are
games on the contract curve. All equilibria of these games (Nash, Stackelberg
or whatnot) are Pareto-efficient. The usual caveats apply about (1) dynamic
inefficiency, (2) the provision of intergenerational insurance through the .
tax-transfer-public debt mechanism in the presence of incomplete markets
participation and (3) second best complications in the presence of distortionary taxes
and transfers. 
49 Given the structure of taxation and transfer payments in most EC countries,
borrowing involves redistribution from the younger (working) current
generations and from future generations to the current older (retired)
generations. At given intertemporal relative prices (interest rates), this
boosts aggregate consumption today, at the expense of current saving and
therefore (barring Keynesian miracles) at the expense of consumption tomorrow.
It is important to realize that the government can, through its budgetary 
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instruments, achieve exactly the same redistribution and exactly the samestimulus to current consumption with a balanced budget (see e.g. Buiter andKletzer [1992b]). The government deficit and the government debt must be seenin the context of the sum total of redistribution mechanisms betweengenerations. 
50 In Buiter and Kletzer f1991a,b], this argument is developed at greater length,both at a non-technical tevel (Buiter and Kletzer [1991b]) and at a technicallevel (Buiter and Kletzer [1991a]). 
51 The cases of international tax competition, of national subsidy races and ofthe competitive dismantling of national welfare systems in order to attractforeign direct investment come to mind. 
52 A warning that German unification and the ensuing fiscal expansion in Germanymight lead to a real appreciation of the DM was given early on by a number ofauthors; see, in particular, Begg et al. (1990]. 
53 Moreover, since the formal solvency tests only refer to the feasibilityrather than the optimality of fiscal policy, evidence in favor of solvencydoes not necessarily imply that the solvent countries have followed "optimal"fiscal policies. In this regard, the evidence in Roubini and Sachs [1989a,1989b], Roubini [1991], Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini [1991] suggests thatthe tax smoothing view of fiscal policy-making and the optimal seignioragemodel of the inflation tax are both rejected for developed as well asdeveloping countries. In particular, transitory shocks to output andgovernment spending fail to explain the movements of public debt in a largeset of countries and inflation rates do not appear to be correlated (orco-integrated) with tax rates. 
54 See Buchanan, Rowley and Tollison [19861, Roubini and Sachs [1989a, 1989b],Tabellini [19911, Alesina and Drazen 11991], Alesina and Tabellini [1990],Tabellini and Alesina [1990], Nordhaus [1975] Rogoff (1990] and Rogoff andSibert [1989}. For a more systematic survey of this literature see Corsettiand Roubini T1992a]. 
55 Similarly, Alesina and Roubini (1992] and Alesina, Cohen and Roubini [1992,1993) find partsisan and political business cycle effects on inflation ratesfor a large set of OECD countries. 
56 For a more extended discussion of these issues, see Corsetti and Roubini[1992a, b]. 
57 This means that the product of the stock of net government debt and the rate ofgrowth of nominal GDP is subtracted from the government's structural currentdeficit. 
58 Note that this makes sense only if public sector capital formation yields a cash rateof return to the government equal to its cost of borrowing. In that case thecriterion amounts to aiming for a zero or negative single-period primary gap.
59 Net debt refers to public sector debt minus public sector financial and real assets.
60 On this point see the discussion in Garrett and Veingast [1991].
61 Veingast and Garrett [1991] and lilgrom, North and Veingast (1990) stress thisimportant role of institutions as a means to enforce cooperation.
62 Vhile the national central banks will formally survive after EMU, they willbe no more than branch offices of the ECB, with no substantive autonomy. 
63 See Hamada and Porteus (1992] for an historical perspective on monetary union andpolitical integration. 
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